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THAT WAS CLOSE!
REWARD REPORTING OF CYBERSECURITY
“NEAR MISSES”
JONATHAN BAIR, STEVEN M. BELLOVIN, ANDREW MANLEY, BLAKE REID,
ADAM SHOSTACK*

Building, deploying, and maintaining systems with sufficient
cybersecurity is challenging. Faster improvement would be valuable to society
as a whole. Are we doing as much as we can to improve? We examine robust
and long-standing systems for learning from near misses in aviation, and
propose the creation of a Cyber Safety Reporting System (CSRS).
To support this argument, we examine the liability concerns which
inhibit learning, including both civil and regulatory liability. We look to the
way in which cybersecurity engineering and science is done today, and
propose that a small amount of ‘policy entrepreneurship’ could have
substantial positive impact. We close by considering how a CSRS should be
organized and housed.

* Jonathan Bair and Andrew Manley are 2018 graduates of the University of Colorado
Law School. Steven M. Bellovin is the Percy K. and Vida L.W. Hudson Professor of Computer
Science at Columbia University and affiliate faculty at Columbia Law School. Blake Reid is
an Associate Clinical Professor at Colorado Law and supervised Mr. Bair’s and Mr. Manley’s
work on this topic in the Samuelson-Glushko Technology Law & Policy Clinic. Adam
Shostack is a consultant.
Author names are listed in alphabetical order.
The authors wish to thank J. Pierre De Vries and Matt Curtin for many helpful comments on
drafts of this article.
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INTRODUCTION
A.

Need for Information

In aviation, medicine, nuclear power plant operation, and even
mountaineering, near misses are treated as an important source of
knowledge. Each field has a formalized and structured near-miss
reporting and analysis system. These systems give practitioners,
researchers, and regulators many of the benefits of accident
investigations without the human or economic costs of those accidents.
In cybersecurity, we do not have such a system, but we do have a lot
of accidents. Could a near-miss program be helpful? What would it
look like? What issues do we need to address to bring it about?
The proliferation of technology provides consumers
immeasurable benefits, but also creates great vulnerability. In recent
years, we have seen explosive growth in the number of damaging
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cyber-attacks.1 2017 alone saw worms and malware such as
WannaCry, Petya, NotPetya, Bad Rabbit, and the massive Equifax
breach, among many others.2 Uber was the target of several lawsuits
within days after disclosing a breach and (apparent) ransom payment.3
Currently, there is no mechanism in place to facilitate understanding
of these threats, or their commonalities.
While information regarding the causes of major breaches may
occasionally become public after the fact, what is lacking is an
aggregated data set which could be analyzed for research purposes.
Collecting data about such incidents is difficult because of liability
concerns. Moreover, there is a linguistic quagmire in the definitions of
breach, incident, and hack, all of which are intimately interconnected
with reporting mandates and liability concerns. We propose here to
stay outside that debate, and instead look to “near misses.” We
consider a near miss to be an event short of a full incident, because
some controls function as intended and contain the damage.4 For
example, if a person clicks on a link in a phishing email, and the
phishing site has been taken down, then that event would be a near
miss.5 Research into near misses could provide clues as to trends in
attacks, the effectiveness of controls, and avoidable mistakes made on
the part of operators, among other valuable data.
B.

Mandatory Incident Reporting/Investigation has Challenges

There is an important distinction to be made between reporting
on vulnerabilities and reporting on incidents, and we limit our

1. Tara Seals, Cyber-Attack Volume Doubled in First Half of 2017, INFOSECURITY
(Aug. 11, 2017), https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/cyberattack-volumedoubled-2017/ [https://perma.cc/3WBK-XYSF].
2. Bill Chappell, WannaCry Ransomware: What We Know Monday, NPR
(May 15, 2017, 2:31 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/05/15/528451534/
wannacry-ransomware-what-we-know-Monday [https://perma.cc/XSS4-X8BP]; Brian Krebs,
‘Petya’ Ransomware Outbreak Goes Global, KREBS ON SECURITY (June 27, 2017),
https://krebsonsecurity.com/2017/06/petya-ransomware-outbreak-goes-global/
[https://perma.cc/AX5R-BPZX]; Josh Fruhlinger, Petya Ransomware and NotPetya Malware:
What You Need to Know Now, CSO (Oct. 17, 2017, 2:59 AM), https://www.csoonline.com/
article/3233210/ransomware/petya-and-notpetya-the-basics.html [https://perma.cc/3MWK9FAF]; Taylor Hatmaker, A New Ransomware Attack Called Bad Rabbit Looks Related to NotPetya,
TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 24, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/10/24/badrabbit-notpetya-russiaukraine-ransomware-malware/ [https://perma.cc/RNS8-HX2P]; Elizabeth Weise, A Timeline
of Events Surrounding the Equifax Data Breach, USA TODAY (Sept. 26, 2017, 12:06 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2017/09/26/timeline-events-surrounding-equifaxdata-breach/703691001/ [https://perma.cc/9YNF-TNF8]; Zack Whittaker, These were
2017’s Biggest Hacks, Leaks, and Data Breaches, ZDNET (Dec. 18, 2017, 5:21
AM), http://www.zdnet.com/pictures/biggest-hacks-leaks-and-data-breaches-2017/ [https://
perma.cc/374G-63MD].
3. See Cyrus Farivar, Uber Hit With 2 Lawsuits Over Gigantic 2016 Data Breach, ARS
TECHNICA (Nov. 23, 2017, 3:02 AM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2017/11/uber-hitwith-2-lawsuits-over-gigantic-2016-data-breach/ [https://perma.cc/P4HL-357Y].
4. See discussion infra Section I.C.
5. See discussion infra Section I.C.
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discussion to the latter.6 One possible regime for gathering such
information would be to require disclosure of incidents, and to create
a public investigations board which would analyze incidents and issue
public reports on them.7 Mandatory reporting and investigations
would result in better data collection.8 The regime would also cause
firms to internalize, to some extent, the externalities of security.9
However, there are challenges that have made a mandatory
reporting regime difficult to implement10, and there are claims that
such a regime would be more costly than beneficial.11 Microsoft points
out that mandatory reporting may cause firms to divert resources from
more effective security measures to complying with inefficient and
unnecessary reporting requirements.12 Additionally, the lack of clearly
defined terms in this area makes determining what does and doesn’t
qualify as a reportable event challenging.13 Mandatory reporting
regimes are often one-way, with the government requiring private
actors to disclose information, but failing to reciprocate.14 Because
private actors will err on the side of compliance, they are likely to overreport, causing high-value data to become buried and less easy to
identify.15 And to ensure compliance, private actors’ legal counsel may
discourage disclosure to anyone other than the government

6. Vulnerabilities is a term of art in computer security, and those policy questions have
been extensively explored and debated at the highest levels of government. See Rob Joyce,
Improving and Making the Vulnerability Equities Process Transparent is the Right Thing to Do, THE
WHITE HOUSE (Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/improving-makingvulnerability-equities-process-transparent-right-thing/ [https://perma.cc/ZTW6-NAB3].
7. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMPUTERS AT RISK: SAFE COMPUTING IN THE
INFORMATION AGE 179–205 (1991).
8. See, e.g., Steven M. Bellovin, The Major Cyberincident Investigations Board, 10 IEEE
SECURITY & PRIVACY 96 (Nov.-Dec. 2012).
9. Stefan Laube & Rainer Böhme, The Economics of Mandatory Security Breach Reporting
to Authorities, 2 J. CYBERSECURITY 29, 29–31 (2016) (arguing that mandatory breach reporting
“can incentivize firms to enhance their security levels, leading to a reduction of breach
probabilities in the economy. Thus, less breaches propagate and negatively affect others.”).
10. See Steven M. Bellovin & Adam Shostack, Input to the Commission on Enhancing
National Cybersecurity (2016), https://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/papers/Current_and_
Future_States_of_Cybersecurity-Bellovin-Shostack.pdf [https://perma.cc/FM4N-ZP4R].
11. See, e.g., DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, ENHANCING RESILIENCE THROUGH
CYBER INCIDENT DATA SHARING AND ANALYSIS: OVERCOMING PERCEIVED OBSTACLES TO
SHARING INTO A CYBER INCIDENT DATA REPOSITORY (2015), https://www.dhs.gov/
sites/default/files/publications/Overcoming%20Perceived%20Obstacles%20White%20Paper
_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/3JZY-KHWE].
12. Cybersecurity Policy Toolkit: Mandatory Incident Disclosure Models, MICROSOFT,
https://query.prod.cms.rt.microsoft.com/cms/api/am/binary/RW5Alw (last visited Mar. 24,
2018) [https://perma.cc/QC5F-HST3].
13. Id.
14. Should Companies be Required to Share Information About Cyberattacks?, WALL STREET
J. (May 22, 2016, 10:00 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/should-companies-be-required-toshare-information-about-cyberattacks-1463968801 [https://perma.cc/G4KR-NH9E].
15. Id.
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authority.16 As such, if a mandatory reporting regime is crafted
incorrectly, it may result in an increase in social cost.17
C.

The Aviation Sector Offers Robust Models

An alternative is a voluntary reporting scheme, possibly
combined with an incentive scheme, whereby organizations who
experience a near miss would file a report encompassing important
details of the event to some neutral party. That party would encode
the data and place it in a database, perform analyses, and issue reports.
This database could then be used both by researchers and by the
industry as a whole. People could learn what works, what does not
work, and where the weak spots in security are.
The adoption of such a voluntary confidential information
sharing system has proved valuable to the aviation industry. The most
notable, and one of the earliest, is the Aviation Safety Reporting
System (ASRS) housed within the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA).18 The ASRS is a system which collects
voluntary information regarding near misses in aviation.19 This data is
then analyzed to identify weaknesses in safety systems, and possibly
to identify means to prevent similar incidents occurring in the future,
thus improving the safety of air travel overall.20 The ASRS is successful
for multiple reasons: First, it recognizes that to understand “why
people did what they did, the best approach is to just ask [them].”21
Adequately anonymizing the data, and ensuring confidentiality and
security of the data encourages reporters to be more open and honest
in their responses.22 Additionally, NASA is a well-respected scientific
agency without any enforcement interests, which reduces concerns
that a reporter risks drawing unwanted attention to themselves.23 And
the FAA, for its part, treats reporting to the ASRS as “indicative of a
constructive attitude” and will include that in its determination of
penalties if incidents are reported in a timely manner.24 These penalties

16. MICROSOFT, supra note 12.
17. Laube & Böhme, supra note 9 (“Interdependence between information

systems allows breaches to propagate and negatively affect others . . . [causing] negative
externalities in an economy.” In other words, creating a social cost.).
18. Program Briefing, AVIATION SAFETY REPORTING SYSTEM, https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/
overview/summary.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2018) [https://perma.cc/36BG-Y8ET].
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. ASRS: THE Case for CONFIDENTIAL INCIDENT REPORTING SYSTEMS, https://
asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rs/60_Case_for_Confidential_Incident_Reporting.pdf (last visited
Mar. 24, 2018) [https://perma.cc/W3WD-3JCB].
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. FAA, ADVISORY CIRCULAR: AVIATION SAFETY REPORTING PROGRAM (2011),
https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/AC%2000-46E.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T9KR-6PDZ].
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can be quite severe, including revoking a license and ending a career
in aviation, and so mitigating those penalties becomes quite important.
A clear definition of what constitutes an accident allows the FAA
to investigate accidents, while rewarding the reporting of near-miss
events to NASA. Moreover, “Title 14 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (14 C.F.R.) part 91, section 91.25 prohibits the use of any
reports submitted to NASA under the ASRS (or information derived
therefrom) in any disciplinary action, except information concerning
criminal offenses or accidents that are covered under paragraphs 7a(1)
and 7a(2).”25
These features have led to a successful program. ASRS’ intake of
reports, which averaged 400 reports per month in its inaugural year,
has now grown to an average of over 7,600 reports per month.26 These
reports are also used to generate safety alerts, with the underlying
problem being addressed in 56% of instances where an alert was
issued, and action taken as a direct result of the alert in 22% of
instances.27 The database of de-identified reports is also searchable and
open, handling over 1,500 queries per month.28 And lastly, the ASRS
publishes a monthly newsletter, Callback, aiming to provide
educational safety information to the aviation community.29 They are
sufficiently valued that the U.S. ASRS program has been emulated in
the aviation regulations of many other countries.30
In addition to ASRS, airlines tend to operate internal “aviation
safety programs,” some of which feed into other cross-organizational
safety programs, such as the FAA’s Aviation Safety Information
Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS) System.31
Voluntary information sharing regimes are also frequently
employed in other industries. The Federal Railroad Administration
operates a Confidential Close Call Reporting System (C3RS).32 As with
ASRS, the C3RS allows for confidential reporting of unsafe conditions
25. Id.
26. AVIATION

SAFETY REPORTING SYSTEM, ASRS 2016 PROGRAM BRIEFING
(2016), https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/ASRS_ProgramBriefing2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/
N6XT-2C5E].
27. Id. at 26.
28. Id. at 33.
29. Id. at 37.
30. Id. at 48.
31. ASIAS performs analysis between organizations, learning from telemetry data that
one airline or another experiences meaningfully more issues flying into a given airfield.
About ASIAS, FAA, https://www.asias.faa.gov/apex/f?p=100:1:::::: (last visited Mar. 24, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/QQ9R-JTAB]; Performance Success Stories How the FAA and Airlines Sleuth
for Safety, FAA (Aug. 2016), https://www.faa.gov/nextgen/snapshots/stories/?slide=36
[https://perma.cc/5K9H-JGT7]. We focus on ASRS in this article in part because the
technology sector has more diverse equipment, operated in more diverse ways and with less
rigor than the aviation sector. The obvious rejoinder of “standardize more” would likely
have an impact on the amount of innovation in the sector.
32. Confidential Close Call Reporting System – C3RS, FED. RAILROAD ADMIN.,
https://www.fra.dot.gov/c3rs (last visited Mar. 24, 2018) [https://perma.cc/Y68X-U7CN].
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by stake holders, which in turn allows for changes in rail
transportation which make the system safer.33 A similar system can be
found for medical devices with the Food and Drug Administration,
and for nuclear power plants in the IAEA.34 Some, but not all, of these
schemes involve explicit incentive structures.35 Similar programs for
near-miss reporting exist in other fields, ranging from medicine36 to
mountaineering.37
D.

Our Proposal

We propose the creation of a similar system for cybersecurity near
misses. When there is a near miss, companies and their employees
would be encouraged to file a report with some organization. As is
done for aviation, this organization would review the report for
completeness (and solicit additional data if necessary), anonymize it,
publish it in a database, and analyze the reports and data for actionable
results. We call this system a Cyber Security Reporting System, CSRS,
in homage to the ASRS.
There are some obvious challenges. The first, of course, is the
reluctance of corporate executives to disclose details of an event, be it
incident or near miss. They may be afraid of liability,38 of personal

33. Id.
34. Adverse

Event
Reporting
Data
Files,
FDA,
https://www.fda.gov/
MedicalDevices/Safety/ReportaProblem/ucm124064.htm (last visited March 24, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/EZA3-SAYQ]; INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, GUIDE ON
INCIDENT REPORTING SYSTEM FOR RESEARCH REACTORS (2000), https://wwwns.iaea.org/downloads/ni/irsrr/guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/7A88-W2MH].
35. Incentives matter because cybersecurity staff frequently have more work than time,
and an incentive program will help ensure that data is gathered, written down, and sent to
an analysis center.
36. See Adverse Events, Near Misses, and Errors, PATIENT SAFETY NETWORK, https://
psnet.ahrq.gov/primers/primer/34/adverse-events-near-misses-and-errors (last updated
June 2017) [https://perma.cc/9YM4-FDFX]; such programs are not only in the U.S. For
example, in “Learning from Near Misses,” The Canadian Medical Protective Association
opens with a reference to aviation: “A near miss in aviation refers to 2 aircraft in flight
narrowly missing a collision with each other. A near miss in medicine is an event that might
have resulted in harm but the problem did not reach the patient because of timely
intervention by healthcare providers or the patient or family, or due to good fortune. Near
misses may also be referred to as ‘close calls’ calls or ‘good catches.’” Learning from Near
Misses, CANADIAN MED. PROTECTIVE ASS’N, https://www.cmpa-acpm.ca/serve/docs/
ela/goodpracticesguide/pages/adverse_events/Quality_improvement/learning_from_near_
misses-e.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2018) [https://perma.cc/VM2S-VK8N].
37. The American Alpine Club publishes an annual series of books, of “Accidents in
North American Climbing.” ACCIDENTS IN NORTH AMERICAN CLIMBING, AMERICAN ALPINE
CLUB (2017); See also MAUD VANPOULLE ET AL., INCIDENTS AND NEAR-MISSES IN MOUNTAIN
SPORTS, (2017).
38. See infra Section I.
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jeopardy,39 investor reaction,40 or even disclosing details of their
network and its weaknesses to other attackers.
A second challenge is actually setting up the reporting system.
Apart from the issue of who would run it or pay for it, actually
handling the reports is challenging. It’s hard to preserve necessary
details while still obscuring the identity of the reporting organization;
it’s also difficult to protect individual employees from fear of possible
retaliation.
Still, this seems to us to be the best approach to gathering and
analyzing this very important data. Right now, it is difficult for
defenders to learn what has or hasn’t worked; voluntary reporting
seems more feasible for learning useful defensive lessons than other
approaches.
This paper will first address both the civil and regulatory liability
companies face under the current regime, and how our current lack of
clear definitions make navigating such liabilities difficult. It will then
turn to current practices and the rationales behind them, how better
information can enable scientific work to improve those practices, and
how regulators can encourage experimentation and learning. Lastly,
this paper will address why action is necessary, what specifically
needs to be done, and explains why the proposal presented in this
paper is the best solution.
I.

LIABILITY CONCERNS INHIBIT LEARNING

The continuing failure to adequately develop cybersecurity has
prompted calls for a new regulatory framework and government
intervention.41 In the absence of such an overarching federal
39. The Equifax breach cost the chief executive officer, chief information officer, and
chief security officer their jobs. See Cyrus Farivar, After Huge Equifax Breach, CEO ‘Retires,’
ARS TECHNICA (Sept. 26, 2017, 7:42 AM)), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2017/09/afterhuge-equifax-breach-ceo-retires [https://perma.cc/Z82S-2RAG]; Cyrus Farivar, Equifax
CIO, CSO ‘Retire’ in Wake of Huge Security Breach, ARS TECHNICA (Sept. 15, 2017,
4:54 PM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2017/09/equifax-cio-cso-retire-in-wake-ofhuge-security-breach/ [https://perma.cc/8MBD-2RQX].
40. See Michael E. Kanell, Equifax Faces Bumpy Road, but Expected to Survive,
MYSANANTONIO.COM (Nov. 24, 2017, 2:12 PM), http://www.mysanantonio.com/business/
national/article/Equifax-faces-bumpy-road-but-expected-to-survive-12381707.php (stating
that Equifax lost about a third of its market value following the breach)
[https://perma.cc/W3G6-LJB7].
41. See Bruce Schneier, Don’t Waste Your Breath Complaining to Equifax about Data Breach,
CNN (Sept. 11, 2017, 6:23 PM), http://cnn.it/2gYLiM4 [https://perma.cc/8E5L-W9HG]; Bruce
Schneier, On the Equifax Data Breach, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY (Sept. 13, 2017, 12:49 PM), https://
www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2017/09/on_the_equifax_.html (“Market failures like
[cybersecurity] can only be solved through government intervention. By regulating the
security practices of companies that store our data, and fining companies that fail to comply,
governments can raise the cost of insecurity high enough that security becomes a cheaper
alternative.”) [https://perma.cc/9AUH-R486]; See also Jack Detsch, Cyber Risk Wednesday:
Software Liability—the Good, the Bad, and the Uncomfortable, ATLANTIC COUNCIL (Nov. 30, 2016),
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/events/past-events/cyber-risk-wednesday-softwareliability-the-good-the-bad-and-the-uncomfortable (quoting Bruce Schnier, “‘The market
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cybersecurity law, numerous private and government organizations
are pursuing different approaches to hold companies responsible for
data breaches.42 As a result, companies may be subject to a wide range
of both regulatory (statutory) and civil liability—unfair or deceptive
practices, breach of contract, negligence, unjust enrichment, and
negligent misrepresentation among others—for failure to adequately
protect data.43 Particularly, enforcement and civil actions may be
brought in the U.S. by the individuals about whom data was lost, other
businesses impacted by the breach, shareholders of the company,
government agencies such as the U.S. Federal Trade Commission
(FTC), the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), state
Attorneys General, or the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). Congress
may even initiate inquiries into the breach.44 Given the potential for
liability, companies try to say as little as possible about issues,
incidents, or breaches which they experience. They also have a
complex set of tradeoffs to make about how to defend themselves.
They need to set a level of investment and then allocate those resources
to both offer technical protection, and to do so in a way that can be
justified in front of a jury. As we will explain in Section II, this is very
difficult.
A.

Civil Liability

Civil liability from a data breach will often come in the form of
contract damages or tort damages.45 In those cases, a plaintiff will
attempt to show that an implied contract existed to safeguard the data,
that the company was negligent, or negligently misrepresented the
level of security it used to protect data.46 While data-breach claims are
can’t fix this because neither the buyer and the seller care,’ he said. ‘Until now, we’ve given
programmers the right to code the world that they saw fit. We need to figure out the
policy.’”) [https://perma.cc/5TCY-6584].
42. Jenny A. Durkan & Alicia Cobb, After a Cyber Breach, What Laws Are in Play
and Who Is Enforcing Them?, THE CYBERSECURITY LAW REPORT (May 20, 2015)
https://www.quinnemanuel.com/media/1125067/cslr_after-a-cyber-breach-what-laws-arein-play-and-who-is-enforcing-them.pdf (arguing that there is a single liability regime in
place for data breaches and that a company which is breached may seek investigations by
the FBI, Secret Service, SEC, FCC, State A.G.s and the FTC) [https://perma.cc/VS6K-XFDU].
43. See JUDITH H. GERMANO & ZACHARY K. GOLDMAN, AFTER THE BREACH:
CYBERSECURITY LIABILITY RISK 1–2 (2014), http://www.lawandsecurity.org/wp-content/
uploads/2014/06/CLS-After-the-Breach-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/2SN6-BJ22]. But see
DAVID A. ZETOONY ET AL., 2017 DATA BREACH LITIGATION REPORT 1 (Bryan Cave 2017),
https://d11m3yrngt251b.cloudfront.net/images/content/9/6/v2/96690/Bryan-Cave-DataBreach-Litigation-Report-2017-edition.pdf [https://perma.cc/D7NQ-DVGG].
44. GERMANO & GOLDMAN, supra note 43, at 1.
45. Wayne M. Alder, Data Breaches: Statutory and Civil Liability, and How to Prevent and
Defend a Claim, Becker & Poliakoff, 5, https://beckerlawyers.com/wp-content/uploads/
2018/02/20151001_alder_data_breaches.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2018) [https://perma.cc/lx6phlf3].
46. See id. (stating that savvy companies will often seek to protect themselves by
wording contracts such that the standard for data protection is set at the minimum that
applicable laws allow).
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often difficult to prove due to the lack of evidence of an actual harm,
some circuit courts have allowed standing in cases of future harm.47
Other circuit courts reasoned that the ‘threat of future harm’ is too
speculative to proceed however,48 resulting in a circuit split with
plaintiffs in at least one case petitioning the Supreme Court to resolve
the issue of standing, albeit unsuccessfully.49 Regardless, a general
plaintiff friendly trend is increasing the number and cost of settlements
from data breaches.50
Even with the improved chance of standing in some courts,
private parties still face an uphill battle in proving injury after a
breach,51 and private actions remain relatively unsuccessful.52 Indeed,
an exceedingly low percentage of publicly reported breaches actually
lead to a class action.53 While typical consumers may still be unable to
prove injury in data breach cases, the company’s business partners
who experience much more direct financial loss are more easily able to

47. Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App’x 384, 388 (6th Cir. 2016)
(“[A]llegations of a substantial risk of harm, coupled with reasonably incurred mitigation
costs, are sufficient to establish a cognizable Article III injury . . . .”); Remijas v. Neiman
Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Neiman Marcus customers should not
have to wait until hackers commit identity theft or credit-card fraud in order to give the class
standing . . . .”); Attias v. Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 628 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Kevin M. LaCroix,
Deepening Circuit Split on Data Breach Suit Standing, THE D&O DIARY: CYBER LIABILITY (Aug.
6, 2017), https://www.dandodiary.com/2017/08/articles/cyber-liability/deepening-circuitsplit-data-breach-suit-standing/ (“[T]he D.C. Circuit held that the claimants’ risk of future
harm is sufficient to meet Article III standing requirements [in consumer data breach
lawsuits]. . . . join[ing] a growing number of federal appellate courts . . . .”)
[https://perma.cc/XL6J-JLQE]. However, a circuit split exists on the standing argument as the
2nd & 4th Circuits have held the opposite. See Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 2017),
cert. denied, Beck v. Shulkin, 137 S. Ct. 2307 (2017); Whalen v. Michaels Stores, Inc. 689 Fed.
Appx. 89 (2d Cir. 2017).
48. Beck, 848 F.3d at 274 (reasoning that the threat of future harm is too speculative and
thus not clearly imminent to allow standing); In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763, 771–72 (8th
Cir. 2017) (“[C]onclud[ing] that the complaint has not sufficiently alleged a substantial risk
of identity theft . . . and future injury” to support standing).
49. Attias v. Carefirst Inc., 865 F.3d 620 (D.C. Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 86 U.S.L.W.
3409 (U.S. Feb. 20, 2018) (No. 17-641).
50. Carlton Fields et al., Class Action and Regulatory Settlements Reflect the Rising Cost of
Data Breaches, JD SUPRA (July 12, 2017), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/class-actionand-regulatory-settlements-28008/ [https://perma.cc/R4Y2-UH59]; See, e.g., Bowdeya Tweh,
Anthem Agrees to $115 Million Settlement of Data Breach Lawsuit (June 23, 2017, 4:56 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/anthem-agrees-to-115-million-settlement-of-data-breachlawsuit-1498251371 [https://perma.cc/J8KP-F6CL]; Robert Hackett, Data Breaches Now Cost $4
Million on Average, FORTUNE (June 15, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/06/15/data-breach-coststudy-ibm/ (“On average, the cost of a breach has risen to $4 million per incident—up 29%
since 2013—according to research sponsored by IBM’s security division. . .”)
[https://perma.cc/ABX4-MLMX].
51. ZETOONY ET AL., supra note 43.
52. Alex Pearce, Defending The Business-To-Business Data Breach Lawsuit, JD SUPRA (Nov.
14, 2017), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/defending-the-business-to-business-data70251/ [https://perma.cc/W3SU-797M].
53. ZETOONY ET AL., supra note 43, at 3 (“806 breaches were publicly reported during
[2016]. . . . only 76 federal class action complaints were filed during the same timeframe, and
these filings related to only 27 unique defendants” meaning only about 3.3% of such breaches
led to class action litigation).
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prove standing.54 Even so, if companies have contractually limited
their liability from a cybersecurity incident, an injured party may only
recover on certain contract claims and not negligence claims stemming
from the breach.55 These difficulties suggest that it is the regulatory
liability for which companies should be most concerned.
There is also the chance that a mandatory liability regiment will
be imposed through international agreement. A recent French
government document makes exactly this suggestion:56
Il semble donc pertinent de poser au niveau international un
principe de responsabilité de sécurité des acteurs privés
systémiques dans la conception, l’intégration, le déploiement et
la maintenance de leurs produits et services numériques. Cette
responsabilisation pourrait se traduire par une obligation pour
les entreprises systémiques de garantir la sécurité à long terme
de leurs produits numériques, notamment en fournissant des
correctifs appropriés en cas de vulnérabilité. Le niveau de
responsabilité doit être fixé en fonction du rôle et de la taille de
l’acteur concerné et pourrait se présenter comme une obligation
de moyens plus que de résultats.
(It therefore seems appropriate to establish at the international
level a principle of safety responsibility for systemic private
actors in the design, integration, deployment and maintenance
of their digital products and services. This accountability could
be translated into an obligation for systemic enterprises to
ensure the long-term security of their digital products,
including by providing appropriate fixes in case of
vulnerability. The level of responsibility should be set according
to the role and size of the actor concerned and could be an
obligation of means rather than results.)57

B.

Regulatory Liability

Enforcement actions stemming from a breach can be extremely
costly to companies. Since its 2013 data breach, Target has reportedly
spent over $200 million on legal fees and expenses, with settlements
from suits by state Attorneys General rising to $18.5 million.58 The
recent Equifax breach has also caused a flurry of lawsuits—upwards
54. Pearce, supra note 52.
55. See id. (citing the decision in SELCO Cmty. Credit Union v. Noodles & Company,

267 F.Supp.3d 1288 (D. Colo. 2017) where the court agreed that the economic-loss rule
“prevents plaintiffs who suffer economic loss stemming from contract to recover those losses
through non-contract claims.”).
56. SECRETARIAT-GENERAL FOR NAT’L DEFENCE AND SECURITY, REVUE STRATÉGIQUE DE
CYBERDÉFENSE 89 (2018), http://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/uploads/2018/02/20180206-np-revuecyber-public-v3.3-publication.pdf [https://perma.cc/BW3X-UUV3].
57. Translation primarily by Google Translate.
58. Fields et al., supra note 50.
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of 200 class action suits, and investigations or suits by every state
Attorney General—as well as investigations by the FTC, Congress, and
the DOJ.59 Equifax stands as an exemplar of the potential minefield of
enforcement actions that can be brought following a data breach. We
briefly discuss some of the government organizations involved in such
enforcement actions to demonstrate the liability concerns that
companies face.
The FTC has asserted some authority under Section 5 of the FTC
Act to prevent unfair or deceptive practices in cybersecurity.60 In its
enforcement action against Wyndham Worldwide Corp
(“Wyndham”), the FTC asserted that Wyndham was breached on
three occasions within two years, exposing customer information
which led to over $10.6 million in fraudulent charges.61 The FTC
asserted that Wyndham’s security practices were unfair and exposed
customer’s data to theft by, among other things, failing to employ
reasonable measures to detect and prevent unauthorized access to its
network or conduct proper incident response procedures, allowing the
hackers to use similar methods in each attack.62 In a final settlement,
Wyndham agreed to create a comprehensive information security
program to protect cardholder data, and to conduct annual security
audits and maintain safeguards in connections to its franchisees.63
59. Brenda R. Sharton & David S. Kantrowitz, Equifax and Why It’s So Hard to Sue a
Company for Losing Your Personal Information, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept. 22, 2017),
https://hbr.org/2017/09/equifax-and-why-its-so-hard-to-sue-a-company-for-losing-yourpersonal-information [https://perma.cc/4QJM-D8CD]; Patrick Rucker, Exclusive: U.S.
Consumer Protection Official Puts Equifax Probe on Ice - Sources, REUTERS (Feb. 4, 2018,
11:14 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-equifax-cfpb/exclusive-u-s-consumerprotection-official-puts-equifax-probe-on-ice-sources-idUSKBN1FP0IZ [https://perma.cc/A
Z4B-523P]; Brian Fung & Hamza Shaban, The FTC is Investigating the Equifax
Breach. Here’s Why that’s a Big Deal, WASH. POST (Sept. 14, 2017), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/09/14/the-ftc-confirms-its-investi
gating-the-equifax-breach-adding-to-a-chorus-of-official-criticism/ [https://perma.cc/5CQL29K9].
60. See FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015) (holding that an
alleged failure to maintain reasonable data security could constitute unfair competition and
that the FTC has authority over some cybersecurity issuers pursuant to section 5 of the
FTC Act); Privacy & Data Security Update (2016), FTC (Jan. 2017), https://
www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy-data-security-update-2016 (“The FTC’s principal tool is to
bring enforcement actions to stop law violations and require companies to take affirmative
steps to remediate the unlawful behavior.”) [https://perma.cc/75FB-P63A]. See also Daniel J.
Solove and Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L.
REV. 583 (2014) at 636 (“Even vague promises of security such as providing ‘reasonable
security measures to protect against unauthorized access to or unauthorized alteration,
disclosure or destruction of personal information’ can be the basis of an FTC action.”)
61. Wyndham, 799 F.3d at 240.
62. Id. at 241 (In a mockery of good security practice, Wyndham also allowed its hotels
to store payment information in clear readable text, used easily guessed passwords and
usernames, had no firewalls to protect the system, allowed hotels to connect with out-of-date
software, etc.).
63. Wyndham Settles FTC Charges it Unfairly Placed Consumers’ Payment Card Information
at Risk, FTC (Dec. 9, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2015/12/wyn
dham-settles-ftc-charges-it-unfairly-placed-consumers-payment [https://perma.cc/X7U3-TY
YE].
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In another action, the FTC charged HTC America with failing to
take reasonable steps to secure its mobile devices.64 The final
settlement requires HTC to patch vulnerabilities, establish a
comprehensive security program, and undergo independent security
assessments for the next 20 years.65 Notably, there were no allegations
of actual harm in that case.66 The recent LabMD decision effectively
recognizes the ability of the FTC to regulate cybersecurity, but requires
the FTC provide greater specificity in issuing orders so that those
charged with an unfair or deceptive practice may be on notice of how
to remediate.67 The result of FTC enforcement actions is that companies
will face fines, and potentially more burdensome ongoing
requirements.
Because there are no preemptive federal data breach laws, a
company that is subject to a data breach also potentially faces a
number of suits from state Attorneys General. Notably, the HITECH
Act gave state Attorneys General the “authority to bring civil actions
on behalf of their state residents to enjoin conduct and/or obtain
damages for violations of the HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules.”68
Moreover, each state has its own data breach law, further complicating
the defense of a suit stemming from a breach exposing data from
consumers in multiple states.69 The exposure resulting from a data
breach can be staggering. Massachusetts law, for example, allows a
maximum penalty of five thousand dollars for each violation.70
64. HTC America Settles FTC Charges It Failed to Secure Millions of Mobile Devices Shipped
to Consumers, FTC (Feb. 22, 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/
2013/02/htc-america-settles-ftc-charges-it-failed-secure-millions-mobile [https://perma.cc/9P
58-GMLM].
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. LabMD, Inc. v. FTC, 891 F.3d 1286, 1302 (11th Cir. June 06, 2018) (“assuming
arguendo that LabMD’s negligent failure to implement and maintain a reasonable datasecurity program constituted an unfair act or practice under Section 5(a), the Commission’s
cease and desist order is nonetheless unenforceable … [because] [i]t does not enjoin a specific
act or practice.”).
68. Jenny A. Durkan & Alicia Cobb, After a Cyber Breach, What Laws Are in Play and Who
is Enforcing Them?, CYBERSECURITY LAW REPORT (May 20, 2015) https://
www.quinnemanuel.com/media/1125067/cslr_after-a-cyber-breach-what-laws-are-in-playand-who-is-enforcing-them.pdf (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-5(d)(1) (2018) and Health
Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act, Pub. L. 111-5, 124
Stat. 226, Sec. 13410(e) (2009)) [https://perma.cc/X3XA-5BGA].
69. Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Feb. 6,
2018)
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/
security-breach-notification-laws.aspx (“Forty-eight states, the District of Columbia, Guam,
Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands have enacted legislation requiring private or
governmental entities to notify individuals of security breaches of information involving
personally identifiable information.”) [https://perma.cc/8R8M-G3DG]; see also State Breach
Notification Laws, FOLEY & LARDNER, LLP (Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.foley.com/state-databreach-notification-laws/ (a comprehensive chart looking at breach notification laws across
the U.S.) [https://perma.cc/GDR7-E63S].
70. MASS. GEN. LAWS, ch. 93A, § 4 (2018); Commonwealth. v. AmCan Enter., Inc.,
47 Mass. App. Ct. 330, 338, (1999); Chris Hoofnagle (@hoofnagle), Twitter (Nov. 21,
2017), https://web.archive.org/web/20171226224852/https://twitter.com/hoofnagle/status/93
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Suggestive of the exposure companies face, the Equifax breach
resulted in leaking of data on 143 million Americans. At $5,000 per
violation, the cost could be as high as $700 billion from state action.71
Companies with international footprints also face severe penalties
in jurisdictions outside the United States. Chief among these is the
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) promulgated by the
European Commission which took effect in May of 2018.72 The GDPR
dramatically expanded liability for companies, for example, to data
processors, rather than just data controllers.73 Moreover, companies
cannot escape liability by merely relocating their physical
infrastructure outside of the EU because the GDPR, “applies directly
to any entity that processes personal data about EU residents in
connection with (i) the offer of goods or services in the EU; or (2) the
monitoring of behavior in the EU.”74 Failure to comply with the GDPR
can also be extremely costly to companies, amounting to fines of €10
million or 2% of global annual turnover (revenue) from the prior year
for non-compliance with technical measures or €20 million or 4% of
global annual turnover in the prior year for non-compliance with key
provisions of the GDPR.75
The evolution of data-breach litigation and corresponding laws
suggests that companies should be extremely sensitive to the
development of their cyber practices and that mere reputation harm is
giving way to costly civil litigation and enforcement actions. Although
private actions still lag in terms of likelihood of success, regulatory
enforcement can subject companies to massive fines and corrective
measures.

3135314045906944 (Hoofnagle strongly implies in a tweet that in California a “violation” is
per person, “Uber will have direct liability if facts bear out. Total liability is # of nondisclosure * $2500 - whatever the judge thinks reasonable. My guess is in excess of $500mm.”)
[https//perma.cc/764E-Y3KS].
71. See AmCan Enter., 47 Mass. App. Ct. at 338 (“In awarding $1,000,000 against the
defendants . . . [t]he judge correctly noted that each deceptive solicitation may be viewed as
a separate statutory violation for which a judge may . . . impose a separate civil penalty.”).
72. GDPR Portal: Site Overview, EUGDPR.ORG, https://www.eugdpr.org/ (last visited
Mar. 24, 2018) [https://perma.cc/K3EU-K4L5].
73. Jonathan Millard & Tyler Newby, EU’s General Data Protection Regulation: Sweeping
Changes Coming to European and U.S. Companies, ABA: SECTION OF LITIG. (May 23, 2016),
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/technology/articles/spring2016-0516-eugeneral-data-protection-regulation.html [https://perma.cc/8JTX-G7U9].
74. Id. (An American near-miss analysis center is unlikely to be offering goods or
services, or to monitor behavior in the EU, and so is likely outside the GDPR. Multi-national
entities contributing data might choose to report [Systems administrator] rather than a name,
or the analysis center might have appropriate confidentiality measures).
75. Technical measures such as impact assessments, breach notifications and
certifications.
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Defining Incidents and Near Misses

Given the potential legal minefield, it is important to take a step
back and discuss the difference between an incident and a near miss,76
so we can better understand the underlying incentives to share
information.
Borrowing from the aviation industry’s successes, we briefly
sketch how defining incident and near miss works there. The aviation
sector is comprehensively regulated by the FAA, and an aircraft
accident is defined by law.77 Near misses are defined as “when a
person was able to avoid injury and/or illness, and when no property
damage occurs” and that “documentation of near-misses is important
for developing mishap prevention strategies.”78 Clear definitions of
terms allows the FAA to say that near misses are events which are
neither accidents nor crimes. The clear line between accident and near
miss helps set minds at ease about reporting.
Generally, near-miss events occur when some controls function
as intended, and others do not. This allows us to observe the failure of
some controls and learn from those. Learning from near misses is
something that safety engineers have long implemented in their
practices.79 Some define near misses as an “infrequent alarm or
warning signal,” cautioning that the definition cannot be too loose that
near misses will be so common that they are ignored as “pesky
nuisances.”80
The concept of learning from what did work is very important.
This was a lesson learned during World War II. Studying combat
damage to returned aircraft, the military tended to add armor in the
places that showed more hits. An American statistician, Abraham
Wald, reasoned that this was incorrect: the planes that had returned
were those that had survived; hits in those places were thus less likely
to be fatal. By contrast, planes hit in other areas were shot down; thus,
those areas—ones that had not been hit in the surviving planes—were
76. The profusion of definitions made for trouble even in writing this paper, with
disagreement between authors on which word to use, and when to use them.
77. 49 C.F.R. § 830.2 (2016) (“[A]n occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft
which takes place between the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight
and all such persons have disembarked, and in which any person suffers death or serious
injury, or in which the aircraft receives substantial damage.”).
78. FAA, CHAPTER 7. MISHAP REPORTING (Sept. 26, 2003), at 125
https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/order/occ_safety/order3900/media/ch07.pdf
(definition of Near Miss) [https://perma.cc/383K-2283]; Richard Korman, How Airlines Decide
What Counts as a Near Miss, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 2, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/
technology/archive/2016/12/aviations-opaque-definition-of-the-near-miss/509027
(Others
have questioned the opacity of how the aviation industry determines what is “a forgettable
mishap and [what is an] investigation-worthy mistake.”) [https://perma.cc/A22M-5CN2].
79. Russell Cameron Thomas, The Cost of a Near-Miss Data Breach, THE NEW SCHOOL OF
INFORMATION SECURITY: BLOG (Oct. 6, 2009), https://newschoolsecurity.com/2009/10/thecost-of-a-near-miss-data-breach/ [https://perma.cc/VU45-Q47M].
80. Korman, supra note 78.
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what needed armor.81 A near-miss is thus the best thing to study: it
represents not an attack that was easily deflected by common
techniques, but one that just barely missed being successful, i.e., a
serious danger point.82
One model for understanding near-misses is Reason’s Swiss
Cheese model.83 Controls are represented as multiple “slices of swiss
cheese.” As a problem progresses, it may either bounce off the cheese
or go through a hole. If it hits cheese, it falls away “harmlessly” as a
“near miss.” Only if it goes through the holes in each piece of cheese
can it cause harm. This allows us to use near-misses to understand
control failures, even if no harm occurs, because at least one “slice” has
prevented the problem from progressing.84
In the cyber context, distinctions between a near-miss and an
incident are not as clear, creating a perception that sharing information
about what’s going wrong may expose organizations to liability. As
discussed above, there are many regulators and enforcers and many
definitions for cyber incidents which they may cover.85 For example, a
computer security incident may be a “violation or imminent threat of
violation of computer security policies, acceptable use policies, or
standard security practices.”86 Even though such definitions are
designed with the best of intentions to include “imminent threat,” and
computer security policies, they nonetheless create a problem for
sharing near-miss information. If “incident” includes “imminent
threats”, then prudent legal practice may dictate treating those
“imminent threats” as potential focal points for investigation or
lawsuit.
Most of the efforts around defining incidents are focused on
expanding and creating inclusive definitions. If companies are unclear
as to the effects of disclosure of incidents or near misses and how such
disclosure can potentially harm companies in subsequent civil
litigation, they will be less likely to share near-miss information.87 It
may be possible for expansive definitions of incident and near-miss to
co-exist peacefully in situations where reports go to different places,
81. W. Allen Wallis, The Statistical Research Group, 1942-1945, 75 J. AM. STATISTICAL
ASS’N 320, 322–23. (1980).
82. This also illustrates that the dichotomy of “near miss” or “incident” may be too
constraining, and public policy or a CSRS may benefit from a third category which is
damaging but not catastrophic.
83. James Reason, The Contribution of Latent Human Failures to the Breakdown of Complex
Systems, 327 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL SOC’Y B: BIOLOGICAL SCI. 475 (1990).
84. See JAMES REASON, THE HUMAN CONTRIBUTION: U NSAFE ACTS, ACCIDENTS AND
HEROIC RECOVERIES, 95–103 (2008).
85. Our discussion above is focused on liability for an organization that is breached. A
comprehensive definition of incident might need to account for intrusions that violate the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act or other laws without meeting the criteria of a breach.
86. About Us, US-CERT, https://www.us-cert.gov/about-us [https://perma.cc/78KQZJ8E].
87. See GERMANO & GOLDMAN, supra note 43, at 2.
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and incentives are structured as influence on regulatory judgement.
Reporting could then be something that both creates no additional
jeopardy, and reporting an incident as if it were a near-miss produces
no substantial benefit. Regardless, clear definitions cannot help but
reduce uncertainty.
II.

IMPROVE SCIENCE TO IMPROVE OUTCOMES

By observation, it is hard to secure systems.88 We would like to be
able to emulate the engineers who build bridges, and who assert that
each new bridge will withstand the forces that will be brought to bear
on it.89 We’d like to be able to state that we have engineered in a safety
factor, so even if our calculations are off, the bridge will not collapse.
Neither the security of software nor computer operations have
achieved an engineering discipline like that. We cannot describe the
basic forces at work, the needed strengths of components, or assess a
safety factor.90 Engineers study both their practices and their
outcomes. Their practices are the tasks, skills and methods that they
bring to bear in a project, and the outcomes are the observed result of
those practices.
In this section, we will discuss practices and outcomes that we
believe are important to security and why, including: identifying what
drives the selection of practices or controls in use today; determining
how we assess the controls we’re using, and how and what
information is shared; and how new types of information flows could
dramatically improve practices and outcomes.
A.

What Security Practices and Outcomes are Important?

Organizations invest resources in information security practices,
hoping to reduce the frequency and likelihood of incidents, which are
a form of bad outcome.91 Global spending on security products and
88. Tajha Chappellet-Lanier, Audit: OPM Still Faces Information Security Weaknesses 2
Years After Breaches, FEDSCOOP (July 11, 2017), https://www.fedscoop.com/opm-securityaudit-2017/ [https://perma.cc/GWW8-EU9U].
89. See HENRY PETROSKI, ENGINEERS OF DREAMS: GREAT BRIDGE BUILDERS AND THE
SPANNING OF AMERICA 75 (1996) (for background on bridge building practices; for an inquest
into wind pressure involved in the collapse of the Tay Bridge).
90. See generally GARY MCGRAW, SOFTWARE SECURITY: BUILDING SECURITY IN (2006);
STEVEN BELLOVIN, THINKING SECURITY: STOPPING NEXT YEAR’S HACKERS (2015); ADAM
SHOSTACK, THREAT MODELING: DESIGNING FOR SECURITY (2014).
91. “The Framework enables organizations – regardless of size, degree of cybersecurity
risk, or cybersecurity sophistication – to apply the principles and best practices of risk
management to improving the security and resilience of critical infrastructure” and
“Organizations can determine activities that are important to critical service delivery and
can prioritize investments to maximize the impact of each dollar spent. Ultimately, the
Framework is aimed at reducing and better managing cybersecurity risks.”). NIST,
FRAMEWORK FOR IMPROVING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE CYBERSECURITY 1–2 (2014),
https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cyberframework/cybersecurityframework-021214.pdf (“Other outcomes to avoid include systems not delivered, systems
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services is now approaching $100 billion.92 In spite of these
investments however, security incidents seem to be getting worse and
more frequent.93 Practitioners bemoan the difficulty of assessing risk
to a granularity such as “very risky” or “not very risky,” never mind
quantifying risk. Such quantification is a precursor to being able to
answer the question “does this practice or control change our risk?”
Security practice in industry is driven by a mix of standards and
a desire to innovate to defeat emergent attack techniques, with the
majority of spending historically focused on compliance with
standards.94 (There are exceptions, of the “proving the rule” sort.)
However, standards are lagging, and so some organizations invest in
innovation of various sorts.
It is reasonable to think that before a control is added to a
standard, someone rigorously assessed it for effectiveness. The
assessment could be done by a standards body, or they could rely on
someone else’s rigorous assessment. Unfortunately, we have few ways
to assess effectiveness, and their rigor is open to question. In the matter
of D-Link, the FTC relied on “the OWASP top ten” vulnerability list as
part of their determination of what constitutes “reasonable” security.95
But the process for determining that top ten list has come under
scrutiny with some questioning whether one of the elements in a new
draft version is merely a “vendor pitch.”96
which are unusable, or which exceed their time or cost budgets…”) [https://perma.cc/JLH43AM3].
92. Gartner Says Detection and Response is Top Security Priority for Organization in
2017, GARTNER (Mar. 14, 2017), http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/3638017 [https://
perma.cc/PN6C-6TP5].
93. The U.S. does not mandate reporting of security incidents except in exceptional
circumstances, and there is no centralized register of incidents which would allow us to
authoritatively state that either the number or severity is rising. As required by FISMA, the
U.S. Government does report on its own incidents. In the 2016 report, the Acting Federal
Chief Information Security Officer says “the FY 2016 incident data is not comparable to prior
years’ incident data.” Grant Schneider, Federal Cybersecurity: Administration Releases Annual
Report on Agency Cyber Performance, FISMA, https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
whitehouse.gov/files/briefing-room/presidential-actions/related-omb-material/FISMA
_blog_v-7.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2018) [https://perma.cc/RT8U-TQA4].
94. Warwick Ashford, Security Spending Not on Most-Effective Controls, Report Reveals,
COMPUTER WEEKLY (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.computerweekly.com/news/252433722/
Security-spending-not-on-most-effective-controls-report-reveals (“The report notes that
while in the past, compliance has been the primary driver for setting security spending
priorities, the fear of the financial penalties from data breaches has taken over the top spot,
with 39% citing it as the top stimulus for security spending, up from 35% a year ago.”)
[https://perma.cc/8MMX-JNHK].
95. Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief at 5, FTC v.
D-Link Corp., No. 3:17-cv-00039 (N.D. Cal. 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/
documents/cases/170105_d-link_complaint_and_exhibits.pdf (OWASP is a non-profit that
assembles a top ten list of vulnerabilities, but knowing that list is usually referred to simply
as “the top ten” gives a sense of its pervasiveness.) [https://perma.cc/SW4F-HKSE].
96. Steve Ragan, Contrast Security Responds to OWASP Top 10 controversy, CSO (Apr. 26,
2017, 4:00 AM), https://www.csoonline.com/article/3192505/security/contrast-securityresponds-to-owasp-top-10-controversy.html (discussing the charges that a new addition to
the top 10 was merely a marketing campaign for existing Contrast Security products)
[https://perma.cc/PN4K-DEM5].
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Overall, the standards process suffers from a variation of the
difficulty of assessing risk, which is that when a new practice or control
is suggested for a standard, it is hard to assess: if the control works (or
in what circumstances it works); if the new control offers good return
on invested effort; or if the control offers better or worse returns than
other proposed controls.
The outcomes which are most noticeable today are “breaches” of
control over personal information. Usually, but not always, they are
disclosed because of breach disclosure laws and attendant publicity.97
Other breaches are publicized because the attacker publicizes it by
defacing a website,98 using a Twitter account to say things derogatory
to its owner,99 or the data is leaked, for example, the Panama Papers.100
Many incidents are not disclosed.101 There are substantial
disincentives to disclosure.102 If you disclose penetrations, lawsuits
follow,103 and investigations by regulators or enforcement agencies
may also follow. Penalties for failing to disclose breaches vary by state,
with some states imposing penalties per failure to notify, per breach,
or for knowing violations.104 We do not here take a position on the
97. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 69; see also Data Security
and Breach Notification Act, S.2179, 115th Cong. (2017) (Bill proposed in congress creating a
federal disclosure requirement of breaches following the cover up of a breach by Uber).
98. ZHONE-H: UNRESTRICTED INFORMATION, http://www.zone-h.org/archive [https://
perma.cc/XPV3-8FF5] is a collection of such events, as is FREEDOMHACKER, https://
freedomhacker.net/category/website-defacement/ [https://perma.cc/C4QL-H3Z7].
99. See Chris Crum, Skype Blog Hacked To Tell People Not To Use Microsoft Email,
WEBPRONEWS (Jan. 2, 2014), https://www.webpronews.com/skype-blog-hacked-to-tellpeople-not-to-use-microsoft-email-2014-01/ (Syrian Electronic Army took over the @skype
Twitter handle, and tweeted a link to a Skype blog which said, “Don’t use Microsoft emails
(hotmail, outlook), They are monitoring your accounts and selling the data to the
governments.”) [https://perma.cc/YKU2-QXXD].
100. Luke Harding, What are the Panama Papers? A Guide to History’s Biggest Data Leak,
THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 5, 2016, 5:42 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/news/2016/apr/03/
what-you-need-to-know-about-the-panama-papers [https://perma.cc/J44S-SFQZ].
101. See Robert McMillan, Most Retailer Breaches Are Not Disclosed, Gartner Says, CIO (May
23, 2008, 8:00 AM), https://www.cio.com/article/2436102/infrastructure/most-retailerbreaches-are-not-disclosed—gartner-says.html (“In a new study based on interviews with 50
U.S. retailers, Gartner found that 21 of them were certain they had had a data breach.
However, just three of the retailers had disclosed the incident to the public.”)
[https://perma.cc/E6GC-C5G4]. Security experts understand that measuring hidden data is
hard, and that these numbers remain broadly indicative of the levels at which incidents are
concealed or disclosed. As we were writing this, it came out that “Uber concealed [a] data
breach affecting 57 million people.” See Uber Concealed Data Breach Affecting 57 Million People,
BNONEWS (Nov. 21, 2017, 5:50 PM), http://bnonews.com/news/index.php/news/id6751
[https://perma.cc/P5CE-7AFG].
102. See Danny Yadron, Executives Rethink Merits of Going Public with Data Breaches, WALL
ST. J. (Aug. 4, 2014, 7:17 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-contrarian-view-on-databreaches-1407194237 [https://perma.cc/TKA3-SFJW].
103. One attorney said “And your disclosure letter will be exhibit A!” (personal
communication).
104. For example, Alaska has a “Civil penalty payable to state of up to $500 for each state
resident who was not notified, except that the total civil penalty may not exceed $50,000”;
Hawaii says, “Any business that violates any provision of this chapter shall be subject to
penalties of not more than $2,500 for each violation.” State Breach Notification Laws, FOLEY &
LARDNER, LLP (Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.foley.com/files/Publication/c31703ac-ee93-40a5-
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desirability of such penalties. The argument for a penalty is that
without one, no one would take on the risks that accompany reporting
a breach. The argument against is twofold: first, computers often
behave oddly, and to attribute malice or recklessness to what might be
randomness can be expensive; second, warnings are often vague. For
example, “[i]n its initial contact with the DNC last fall, the FBI
instructed DNC personnel to look for signs of unusual activity on the
group’s computer network, one person familiar with the matter said.
DNC staff examined their logs and files without finding anything
suspicious, that person said.”105 In this example case, is it fair to
penalize the DNC for not finding anything suspicious? A system that
balances these disincentives with incentives could substantially
improve computer security.
We would like to reduce the number of important incidents in
cyber, by increasing the predictability of those events, and reducing
their impact.106 Both of these goals are quantitative. Each requires some
form of data gathering. Assessing the predictability of events can be
done bottom-up, that is, how likely is this entity to suffer an event; or
top-down, that is, out of this population, how many entities will
suffer? Impact can also be quantified, by dollar losses, stock price
losses, or estimating with other yardsticks. As long as the estimation
methods are consistent, then we can assess whether the impact of
b295-7e1d9fe45814/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/d6373e89-f460-44fa-afec-a2cbe9fa
23fd/17.MC5826%20Data%20Breach%20Chart%200817%20R1.pdf [https://perma.cc/N7XNB2HQ]. Massachusetts specifies, “[t]he Attorney General may seek injunctive relief, a $5,000
penalty for each violation, and reasonable costs and attorney’s Fees.” Missouri, in contrast,
says, “[t]he Attorney General shall have exclusive authority to bring an action to obtain
actual damages for a willful and knowing violation of this section and may seek a civil
penalty not to exceed $150,000 per breach of the security of the system or series of breaches
of a similar nature that are discovered in a single investigation.” STATE DATA BREACH LAW
SUMMARY, BAKERHOSTETLER (2017), https://www.bakerlaw.com/files/Uploads/Documents/
Data%20Breach%20documents/State_Data_Breach_Statute_Form.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
N9S3-FF6L]. Notably, Alabama and South Dakota do not have breach notification laws as of
September 1, 2017. State Date Security Breach Notification Laws, MINTZ LEVIN, https://
www.mintz.com/newsletter/2007/PrivSec-DataBreachLaws-02-07/state_data_breach_matrix
.pdf (last updated Sept. 1, 2017) [https://perma.cc/9CF3-HGFS]. See also Data Security and
Breach Notification Act, S. 2179, 115th Cong. (2017) (bill imposes mandatory reporting
following a breach and creates criminal penalties for intentional and willful concealment of
a breach).
105. See Mark Hosenball et al., FBI Took Months to Warn Democrats of Suspected Russian
Role in Hack: Sources, REUTERS (Aug. 2, 2016, 8:55 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/ususa-cyber-democrats-reconstruct/fbi-took-months-to-warn-democrats-of-suspectedrussian-role-in-hack-sources-idUSKCN10E09H?feedType=RSS&feedName=technology
News [https://perma.cc/M8WC-EJEQ]; Cf. Adam Shostack, FBI Says their Warnings were
Ignored, ADAM SHOSTACK & FRIENDS (Aug. 17, 2016), https://adam.shostack.org/blog/
2016/08/fbi-says-their-warnings-were-ignored/ (the FBI had evidence that the DNC was
being hacked by the Russians, and they said “look around for ‘unusual activity.’’’)
[https://perma.cc/E8PF-8V4L].
106. There are quantitative approaches to risk assessment. E.g., JACK FREUND & JACK
JONES, MEASURING AND MANAGING INFORMATION RISK: A FAIR APPROACH (2015); DOUG
HUBBARD ET AL., HOW TO MEASURE ANYTHING IN CYBERSECURITY RISK (2016). However, the
data which is used as input to those mechanisms is not standardized, shared, or scrutinized,
and both authors would agree that their methods could work much better with better data.
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events is increasing or decreasing over time.107 How many entities will
suffer, and how badly they will suffer, depends on their practices and
the effectiveness of those practices. As discussed above, this is hard to
measure.
B.

The Importance of Data

Today’s information sharing can usefully be broken into
“sharing” and “publication.” Information is often shared, with rules
about where it can be sent, and some of it, often relating to
vulnerabilities, is then published and made available to all comers. But
a great deal of data, including “indicators of compromise”108 is never
published.109
Published information about vulnerabilities enables several
valuable tasks. First, it can help to prioritize the application of fixes or
patches. Second, it can help with finding variations or similar
vulnerabilities. Third, the open publication of vulnerability
information enables research in a variety of ways.110 That research
includes statistical analysis of vulnerability characteristics, and
research into defensive techniques such as address space layout
randomization.
Perhaps the best example of this research is the class of problems
called “buffer overflows.”111 Knowledge of such problems were kept
107. Dan Geer, A Quant Looks at the Future: Extrapolation via Trend Analysis,
http://geer.tinho.net/geer.cerias.21iii07.pdf (“First, trend analysis is what a statistician will
recommend when the underlying topic of interest is changing and the method of measuring
it is uncertain. In such a circumstance, and so long as the measurement you do have can be
applied consistently, the trend data can be relied on and it is what you need for decision
support.”) [https://perma.cc/Y5YB-HAXJ]. Most events are reasonably measurable, as the
majority of costs are operational expenses in response, capital expenses for upgrades, onetime costs of notification, or impact to reputation/goodwill. There are events that are difficult
to quantify, such as the leak of John Podesta’s emails during the 2016 Presidential election,
which is challenging because of scope. Are we to assess the damage to the Democratic
National Committee, the impact on the election, or the impact of the election on the country?
108. Nate Lord, What are Indicators of Compromise? DATA GUARDIAN (July 27,
2017), https://digitalguardian.com/blog/what-are-indicators-compromise (indicators of
compromise are “pieces of forensic data, such as data found in system log entries or files,
that identify potentially malicious activity on a system or network.”) [https://
perma.cc/YA6Q-4ZXW]. The frequency of discussion around “what may I say about this”
has led the Forum of Incident Response Security Teams to create a “traffic light protocol” as
shorthand for sharing rules, e.g., Traffic Light Protocol, FIRST, https://www.first.org/tlp/(last
visited Mar. 5, 2018) [https://perma.cc/M8UN-RBES], which has been adopted by many
others. These rules are so frequently invoked that it is not unusual in to hear something like
“Tee-Ell-Pee red” in response to the question, “can I share that?”
109. Since the data is not published, it is hard to assess relative quantities.
110. Researchers are often hesitant to plan work whose initiation or publication includes
needless uncertainty.
111. In buffer overflow attacks, an attacker sends a program more data than it is
expecting, originally intended for what is known as an “input buffer.” If the program does
not detect and handle this situation, other areas of memory can be overwritten, with dire
consequences. Conceptually, imagine a clerk writing down someone’s name, but the name
as given is so long that it doesn’t fit in the box on a form and spills over into the “Official Use
Only” section of the form. A carefully constructed overflow can install new computer code,
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as tribal knowledge for at least 25 years112 before they were published
in detail for others to learn from. Within a few years of the first detailed
description, a systematic fix was developed.113 Additional prominent
examples include Hoare’s Turing Lecture, in which he describes a
choice to perform bounds checking in a 1960 compiler.114 Each of these
discussions chose not to describe the attack technique in depth,
perhaps to avoid providing a “roadmap for attackers.” However,
attackers had their own roadmap. The 1988 Morris worm exploited a
buffer overflow in fingerd115 as one of its propagation mechanisms.116
In 1996, a hacker known as Aleph One published a paper now
recognized as seminal, “Smashing the Stack for Fun and Profit.”117 The
paper detailed the problem, and techniques for exploiting it to gain
privileges beyond what the system designers intended.118 Within a
year119, Crispan Cowan and colleagues built “StackGuard,” and their

code written by the attacker. For more information, see generally SEAN SMITH & JOHN
MARCHESINI, THE CRAFT OF SYSTEM SECURITY 6.1 (2008).
112. The trouble with tribal knowledge is that it is undocumented. One author attempted
to find earlier, written, references, to back up personal recollections. Adam Shostack, Buffer
Overflows and History: A Request, ADAM SHOSTACK & FRIENDS (Oct. 20, 2008),
https://adam.shostack.org/blog/2008/10/buffer-overflows-and-history-a-request/
[https://
perma.cc/V3LK-8AZF].
113. The earliest such fix we could find in the literature was in 1971. See JAMES P.
ANDERSON, COMPUTER SECURITY PLANNING STUDY 61 (1972), http://seclab.cs.ucdavis.edu/
projects/history/papers/ande72.pdf, (“In one contemporary operating system, one of the
functions provided is to move limited amounts of information between the system and user
space. The code performing this function does not check the source and destination
addresses properly, permitting portions of the monitor to be overlaid by the user. This can
be used to inject code into the monitor that will permit the user to seize control of the
machine.”) [https://perma.cc/V8U6-F9X2].
114. C.A.R. Hoare, Lecture at Communications of the ACM: The Emperor’s Old Clothes
(Oct. 27, 1980) (“A consequence of this principle is that every occurrence of every subscript
of every subscripted variable was on every occasion checked at run time against both the
upper and the lower declared bounds of the array. Many years later we asked our customers
whether they wished us to provide an option to switch off these checks in the interests of
efficiency on production runs. Unanimously, they urged us not to—they already knew how
frequently subscript errors occur on production runs where failure to detect them could be
disastrous. I note with fear and horror that even in 1980, language designers and users have
not learned this lesson. In any respectable branch of engineering, failure to observe such
elementary precautions would have long been against the law.”).
115. Fingerd was a standard network server on the computers of the day.
116. See Jon A. Rochlis & Mark W. Eichin, With Microscope and Tweezers: The Worm from
MIT’s Perspective, 32 COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM 689 (1989); the resulting indictment was
the first case brought under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012); see
United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1991).
117. Aleph One, Smashing the Stack for Fun and Profit, PHRACK (Nov. 8, 1996), http://
phrack.org/issues/49/14.html [https://perma.cc/H7GN-VWH9].
118. Generally, that was either an elevation from “not authorized to use the system” to
“can run code on the system,” or from “unprivileged and able to run code” to administrative
privilege.
119. The publication dates appear slightly further apart, but note that the call for papers,
7th USENIX Security Symposium, USENIX, http://www.usenix.net/legacy/publications/
library/proceedings/sec98/cfp.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2018) [https://perma.cc/2JYCTWXK], had a submission deadline of September, 1997, which was 10 months after the
publication of Smashing the Stack, and that the paper has a full section of experimental
results.

2018]

THAT WAS CLOSE!

349

paper presents experimental results.120 Even with the first version
built, the team wanted to continue to improve Stackguard121 In 1998,
one author of this paper (Shostack) was an executive at an early
vulnerability scanning company (Netect), and at a trade show, Cowan
approached us to see if we could provide him with a feed of
vulnerabilities which he could use to test StackGuard.122 So even after
the paper was published, there was a real engineering need for more
and detailed information to test defensive mechanisms.
The endurance of problems like buffer overflows and the Morris
worm are symptoms of a failure to learn from mistakes. Both were
largely resolved when the attacks were described in depth to the
public. Publishing such data is critical to improving the overall
security of systems, and we need mechanisms to investigate, gather,
analyze or disseminate root cause information.
The lack of suitable real-world data has led parts of the security
research community to use “synthetic datasets” instead.123
Unfortunately, constructing a suitable synthetic dataset is difficult.
That said, researchers have been driven to using them despite their
known deficiencies. For example, the so-called Lincoln Labs intrusion
detection test dataset is known to be flawed:124
“The corpus generated by Lincoln is unique in the Intrusion
Detection arena and, as such, is the only substantial body of data
that can be used for repeatable comparisons of IDS systems. At
the same time, it may suffer from problems such as those noted
above and may not provide results that reflect field
performance. It appears to be used by researchers who were not
part of the DARPA evaluation who should be aware of both its
strengths and limitations.”125

Information about breaches is published,126 but usually in the
context of how many “records” were stolen. Information about the
proximate causes of the breach is rarely published. Claims such as “a
120. CRISPAN COWAN ET AL., STACKGUARD: AUTOMATIC ADAPTIVE DETECTION AND
PREVENTION OF BUFFER-OVERFLOW ATTACKS (1998), http://www.usenix.net/legacy/
publications/library/proceedings/sec98/full_papers/cowan/cowan.pdf [https://perma.cc/AD
2K-8DN8].
121. This is standard engineering practice, to build a version 1, a version 2, et cetera, and
should not be read as a criticism of the approach or the first release of StackGuard.
122. Personal communication with author Shostack.
123. A synthetic dataset contains artificial data, generated to resemble real data but
having no basis in any actual occurrences.
124. The dataset is so well known in the intrusion detection community that it is
mentioned without any formal citation. John McHugh, Testing Intrusion Detection Systems: A
Critique of the 1998 and 1999 DARPA Intrusion Detection System Evaluations as Performed by
Lincoln Laboratory, 3 ACM TRANSACTIONS ON INFO. & SYSTEM SEC. 262 (2000).
125. See generally id.
126. Generally, legislators have discussed publication as a punishment, a deterrent, and
as a source of learning.
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sophisticated criminal” are common. Such claims do not allow us to
learn. Rarely, there is a public investigation, such as into the 2017
Equifax breach. There, the company revealed that a failure to patch a
server allowed an attacker to break in, but what went wrong is
unclear.127
In the case of Equifax, we seem to have an unusual amount of
information about the failures. From the congressional hearing
transcript:
Mr. Smith. “[T]he security team notified a wide range of people
in the technology team who were responsible for then finding
the vulnerability, applying the patch, and then, days later as is
typical protocol, to deploy a technology scanner to go then look
for the vulnerability, find the vulnerability, if it found a
vulnerability it knew it was not patched. Both human
deployment of the patch and the scanning deployment did not
work. The protocol was followed.”128
Mr. Smith. “The human error was the individual who is
responsible for communicating in the organization to apply the
patch did not [so communicate].”129
The Chairman. “So does that mean that that individual knew
that the software was there and it needed to be patched and did
not communicate that to the team that does the patching? Is that
the heart of the issue here?”130
Mr. Smith. “And I should clarify there that the rationale or the
reason why the scanner or the technology piece did not locate
the vulnerability is still under investigation by outside
counsel.”131

This seems like quite a bit of information, but when we ask
questions, answers are less forthcoming. Questions we can ask
include: what was “the protocol?” In what way was it followed if “the
individual who is responsible for communicating in the organization
to apply the patch” did not do so? How many patches are
127. Oversight of The Equifax Data Breach: Answers for Consumers, Hearing before the
H. Comm. On Digital Commerce and Consumer Protection, Comm. On Energy and Commerce, 115th
Cong. 33-36 (2017), http://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF17/20171003/106455/HHRG-115IF17-Transcript-20171003.pdf [hereinafter Equifax Hearing] (Testimony of Richard Smith)
[https://perma.cc/44LV-TQM8]; See Oversight of the Equifax Data Breach: Answers
for Consumers, COMM. ON ENERGY & COMMERCE (OCT. 3, 2017), https://energy
commerce.house.gov/hearings/oversight-equifax-data-breach-answers-consumers/
(describing details of the hearing) [https://perma.cc/FK7R-5WU8].
128. Id. at 34.
129. Id. at 35–36.
130. Id. at 36.
131. Id. at 37.
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communicated about per day? Through what medium—email,
ticketing, post-it notes—is communication performed? Was there a
protocol for ensuring that the technology located vulnerabilities?
Obviously, we know that there was a failure, but not what it was.
Moreover, we do not know how the breach was detected. We do not
know how data was exfiltrated. We do not know what controls Equifax
had in place at the time of the breach to detect a breach or to detect
data loss.
If a corporate board were to ask a security expert to evaluate if the
specific issues which happened at Equifax could happen to them, that
expert could not give a complete answer given the limited data
available.
Moreover, the information from which lessons might be learned
from the breach is subject to several filters. Those filters include that
the former CEO was discussing them, that there is an active law
enforcement investigation, that many lawsuits have been filed, and
that the questioners were not technically savvy.
There are certainly lessons which can be extracted from the
testimony, but those lessons are a small subset of what might be
learned. Those lessons must be extracted from the messy transcripts
and many news stories, such as “The Equifax Hack Has the Hallmarks
of State-Sponsored Pros.”132 The process of extracting lessons from
many news stories is time consuming and expensive. We have no way
to ask the question “is my vulnerability scanner better than Equifax’s?”
We cannot answer the question “what vulnerability scanner failed,
and why” to start the comparison.
III. POLICY ENTREPRENEURSHIP CAN STIMULATE SCIENTIFIC EFFORTS
We recommend the creation of a Cyber Safety Reporting System
to better equip companies to answer the hard questions discussed in
Section II. This plan involves a mixture of industry involvement and
policy entrepreneurship from government, and is one we think
necessary to improving the flow of security information between
defenders. In this section, we explore the policy entrepreneurship
needed to create a CSRS, and why government would want this
innovation. We also explore ways to structure a CSRS, and consider
the benefits of a centralized reporting system.
Policy entrepreneurship in this area would include two pillars.
The first pillar is shaping industry incentives—considering
participation as a factor in regulatory judgement when determining
liability. The second would be protecting confidentiality.
132. Michael Riley et al., The Equifax Hack Has the Hallmarks of State-Sponsored Pros,
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 29, 2017, 7:09 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2017-0929/the-equifax-hack-has-all-the-hallmarks-of-state-sponsored-pros [https://perma.cc/RCS3NSEH].

352

COLO. TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 16.2

Most regulators today have a set of factors they take into account
in determining liability. Those factors might be read to include
participation in a near-miss program or experiment, or they might be
extended.
The second pillar is explicitly shielding the confidentiality of
reports and reporters. No organization wants to create a roadmap to
its own prosecution by an overzealous prosecutor or regulator.
Regulators could help by explicitly stating that experiments or activity
in near-miss reporting would receive Cybersecurity Information
Sharing Act (CISA) protections,133 and that they would not seek to test
that protection.
A.

The First Pillar: Encouraging Experimentation and Providing
Leniency

As a matter of public policy, regulators should incentivize and
remove roadblocks to experimentation, especially when dealing with
a rapidly changing technology.134 When designed to address
regulatory challenges, such experimentation helps agencies and
companies “earn regulatory authority.”135 The earned regulatory
authority model asserts that authority is developed through
“experimentation and effective administration,” whereby innovative
regulatory policies are rewarded with “more formal authority and
budgetary support,” often by Congress.136 Regulators should
encourage and be encouraged to explore new solutions to existing
problems; in this case the use of leniency towards cybersecurity
information sharing regimes can remove roadblocks to sharing.
Collection of information is essential to the success of the this
proposed CSRS, however the liability concerns discussed in Section I
can present a significant disincentive for companies to share. This
principally stems from the risk that sharing of near-miss information
can still result in liability for companies if the near-miss is actually an
incident. Relevant enforcement agencies must therefore be willing to
grant leniency for companies that choose to participate in the program,
133. Brad S. Karp et al., Federal Guidance on the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of
2015, HARV. L. SCHOOL F. (Mar. 3, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/03/03/
federal-guidance-on-the-cybersecurity-information-sharing-act-of-2015/ (“These protections
include protections from liability, non-waiver of privilege, and protections from FOIA
disclosure, although, importantly, some of these protections apply only when sharing with
certain entities.”) [https://perma.cc/6YR4-4H28].
134. Phil Weiser, Entrepreneurial Administration, 97 B.U. L. REV. 2011, 2013 (2017) (“[I]n
the case of technologically developing fields where experimental regulatory strategies—as
opposed to traditional notice-and-comment rulemaking or adjudication—are often
essential.”).
135. Id. at 2013–14 (discussing earned authority in the context of ENERGY STAR, a
program developed by the EPA, and later codified by congress, and the LEED building
standard which is developed and overseen by a private organization, but which has been
endorsed by several agencies).
136. Id. at 2067–68.
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and may do so through explicit statutory safe harbors (as in the case of
CISA discussed above), memoranda of understanding committing to
“avert their eyes,”137 regulatory forbearance, or prosecutorial
discretion. Ultimately, a CSRS program might be codified in a statute
to provide certainty of protection after experimentation to achieve an
optimal structure.
By exploring how experimentation is implemented in other
instances, we might better understand how to apply it to cybersecurity
information sharing regimes.
In the case of ASRS, the FAA recognizes that “[t]he effectiveness
of this program in improving safety depends on the free, unrestricted
flow of information. . . .”138 To help ensure that goal is met, the FAA
delegated to NASA the job of collecting and analyzing near-miss
information to protect anonymity including anonymity with respect to
“the regulator,” and generally increase the effectiveness of the
program.139 Companies can be more confident that they are protected
from liability and thus be more willing to disclose the information to
improve everyone’s practices because of regulatory restrictions on the
FAA’s use of ASRS reports.140
FTC enforcement actions often consider the general culpability of
the company and whether it was helping or hindering the
investigation.141 Such prosecutorial discretion acts as both a carrot and
a stick to motivate companies to behave well and disclose more
information over the course of the investigation, or risk more severe
penalties later. The FTC has also sometimes expressed a preference for
self-regulation, and self-regulatory approaches may be easier to
achieve than new regulation or legislation.142
137. Such a memoranda exists, for example, between the FAA and NASA—”NASA,
rather than the FAA, accomplished the receipt, processing, and analysis of raw data
[to]ensure the anonymity of the reporter . . . [and] increase the flow of information necessary
for the effective evaluation of the safety and efficiency of the system.” Immunity Policies,
AVIATION SAFETY REPORTING SYSTEM, https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/overview/immunity.html
(last visited Mar. 24, 2018) [https://perma.cc/BX2R-VLJ8].
138. Id.
139. Id. (“NASA ASRS provides for the receipt, analysis, and de-identification of
Aviation Safety Reports. In addition, ASRS publishes and distributes periodic reports of
findings obtained through the reporting program to the public, the aviation community, and
the FAA.”).
140. See 14 C.F.R. § 91.25 (2018) (stating that the Federal Aviation regulations prohibit
the use of reports submitted to ASRS program in disciplinary actions, unless it concerns
accidents or criminal investigations, which are otherwise excluded from the program.).
141. Mark Eichorn, If the FTC Come to Call, FTC (May 20, 2015, 10:51 AM),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2015/05/if-ftc-comes-call (The FTC
will “consider the steps the company took to help affected consumers, and whether it
cooperated with criminal and other law enforcement agencies . . . a company that has
reported a breach to the appropriate law enforcers and cooperated . . . [would be viewed]
more favorably than a company that hasn’t cooperated.”) [https://perma.cc/P6DE-DDVB].
142. Self-Regulatory Principles for Online Behavioral Advertising, FTC (Feb. 2009),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-staffreport-self-regulatory-principles-online-behavioral-advertising/p085400behavadreport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7L4T-B2ZV].
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The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) uses regulatory
forbearance as a tool to achieve public policy goals in a flexible
manner. The Telecommunications Act grants the FCC significant
discretion as to whether it will forbear from some or all provisions of
the Act.143 This grant of flexibility was used most notably in the Open
Internet Order whereby the Commission forbore from over 27
provisions of the Act and 700 different rules and regulations following
its conception of “light-touch” regulation.144 While some view
forbearance with skepticism and alarm due to potential abuses, others
have demonstrated that it is more appropriately seen as a form of
implementation of statutes that Congress writes, filling in gaps in the
law, and addressing perennial governance problems often anticipated
by Congress itself.145
The SEC maintains significant regulatory authority over the
financial sector, both mandating industry behavior and disciplining
bad actors. The SEC will often work in conjunction with the DOJ in
pursuing joint or individual enforcement actions against persons for
charges of insider trading.146 This prosecutorial discretion in bringing
actions allows the SEC to more efficiently allocate its scarce resources
and to provide the flexibility necessary to ensure fairness in its
enforcement process.147 The SEC requires companies to operate
compliance hotlines, and operates a whistleblower program for
accounting fraud. At the same time, they are actively probing
companies regarding their cyber practices and disclosures.148 Recently,
they have issued guidance that companies should “require employees
to appropriately record, process, summarize and report up the
143. 47 U.S.C. § 160 (2012) (“[T]he Commission shall forbear from applying any
regulation or any provision. . . [if] enforcement of such regulation or provision is not
necessary to ensure that the charges. . . are just and reasonable and are not unjustly or
unreasonably discriminatory. . . enforcement of such regulation or provision is not necessary
for the protection of consumers; and forbearance from applying such provision or regulation
is consistent with the public interest.”).
144. Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, GN. Dkt. No. 14-28, Report & Order on
Remand, Declaratory Ruling, and Order, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601, 5604 n.6 (2015), https://
apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-15-24A1.pdf [hereinafter Open Internet Order]
[https://perma.cc/YER6-FXE3].
145. See Daniel T. Deacon, Administrative Forbearance, 125 YALE L.J. 1548 (2016).
146. See Mitchell E. Herr, SEC Enforcement: A Better Wells Process, 32 SEC. REG. L.J. 56
(2004). The Assistant U.S. Attorneys in combination with the SEC will often exercise
prosecutorial discretion when, for example, “no federal interest would be served by
prosecution. . . . the person is subject to effective prosecution in another jurisdiction. . . . [or]
there exists an adequate non-criminal alternative to prosecution.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., U.S.
ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, 9-27.230, 9-27.220, https://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-27000principles-federal-prosecution#9-27.230 (last visited Mar. 24, 2018) [https://perma.cc/9VFMU9M9].
147. Herr, supra note 146, at 57.
148. See Derek Bambauer, Ghost in the Network, 162 U. PENN. L. REV. 1011, 1038 (2014)
(noting section 404 of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 requires firms to “document their
internal controls for financial reporting, including those reliant on information technology,
and then demonstrate to their auditors’ satisfaction that they have implemented those
controls”).
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corporate ladder any information related to cybersecurity risks and
incidents that is potentially required to be disclosed in public
filings.”149 Requirements for disclosure are being revisited, and large
($35m) fines have been imposed.150 Financial institutions under the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 are also mandated to protect
consumers’ personal information by requiring that “firms assess the
risks they face, design a set of countermeasures, implement it, test it,
and adjust the countermeasures as circumstances change.”151 While the
authority of the SEC under these statutes is limited to the financial
sector, a sector specific CSRS would nevertheless align with the desire
to create a robust cybersecurity system for large companies and
financial institutions.
The Department of Health and Human Services stands as a case
where explicit regulatory authority should be met with greater
experimentation.152 Under the auspices of HIPAA and HITECH Act,
HHS has formal regulatory authority to push improved cybersecurity
practices.153 Unfortunately, the HHS’s “Security Rule is not clearly
defined, has failed to incorporate relevant NIST guidance, and is
poorly enforced.”154 Indeed, this failure in oversight forced the FTC to
intervene in the case of LabMD as discussed in Section I above.155
Congress reacted to the HHS’s problems in passing the 21st century
Cures Act to both empower the enforcement of greater information
sharing by the inspector general, and to convene industry to create a
model framework for securely sharing information.156
Among these various examples, we see that government agencies
are often willing to experiment with different regulatory levers to
achieve public policy goals. Whether the lever be explicit in statute as
in the case of CISA, less defined but congressionally blessed as in the
case of the FCC or FTC, or the prosecutorial discretion common to all
149. See Proskauer, SEC Issues Updated Guidance on Public Company Cybersecurity
Disclosures, March 5, 2018, https://www.proskauer.com/alert/sec-issues-updated-guidanceon-public-company-cybersecurity-disclosures [https://perma.cc/YQA9-7YWS].
150. See SEC, Altaba, Formerly Known as Yahoo!, Charged With Failing to Disclose Massive
Cybersecurity Breach; Agrees To Pay $35 Million, April 24, 2018, https://www.sec.gov/
news/press-release/2018-71 (“Yahoo failed to properly investigate the circumstances of the
breach and to adequately consider whether the breach needed to be disclosed to investors.
The fact of the breach was not disclosed to the investing public until more than two years
later…”) [https://perma.cc/5LS5-5F9L]. Such regulatory entrepreneurship creates demand
for ways to demonstrate good faith, and near-miss reporting could serve that purpose.
151. Id. at 1039 (citing to the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, 12 U.S.C. §
1811 (2012)).
152. Weiser, supra note 134, at 2068–72 (discussing the HHS’s failure to spur steps to
encourage better cybersecurity practices and to facilitate information sharing despite having
authority to do so).
153. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. No.
104-191, 110 Stat. 1936; Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health
(HITECH) Act, Pub. L. 111-5, 124 Stat. 226 (2009).
154. Weiser, supra note 134, at 2069 (citing a GAO report).
155. See id. See also discussion supra Part I.
156. Weiser, supra note 134, at 2072.
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of the enforcement agencies, it should be no different in the case of
cybersecurity information sharing, in order to optimize the amount of
data available so that companies may learn to better protect
themselves.
Regulatory judgement should nonetheless remain intact, with the
caveat that good faith participation in the CSRS program would act as
a factor in determining the culpability of the company should an
incident occur. A key benefit of the CSRS program, much like its ASRS
counterpart, is the ability to work ex ante to prevent problems rather
than waiting until an incident has happened to make improvements.
In this way, a company can act proactively to defend its systems and
customers. The reporting of information must therefore be protected
to ensure that companies disclose meaningful information freely. Such
protection does not mean however, that a company is insulated from
all consequences of a failure to adequately protect data, rather it seeks
to encourage the production of data necessary to generate meaningful
reports regarding how companies may improve their cybersecurity.
Without leniency, the risk of legal exposure from enforcement or
other civil actions may be prohibitive for companies considering
reporting, absent other countervailing incentives. This concern may be
traversed by appropriately structuring the sharing regime. First, the
willingness to participate in the program should be taken into account
and factored into the leniency of the regulatory agency, as is the case
of FTC. In the case of ASRS as noted above, the regulation specifically
estops the FAA from using the data shared unless the data is otherwise
not part of the ASRS program.157 The ASRS model splits the work
among several agencies to help ensure the data is protected, whereby
NASA gathers and analyzes the data, but the FAA will have an option
to use the data if the disclosure falls outside of specific definitions of
the program. While not a perfect solution for companies which may
inadvertently disclose something that can harm them, explicit
protections can help companies to make informed decisions about
what information they share and—if appropriately incentivizing—
allows information to flow more freely.
B.

The Second Pillar: Confidentiality and Anonymity Must be
Protected

Even with explicit protections, companies may still be worried
about the sensitivity of the information being supplied and the
possibility that such information would be subject to subpoenas or
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests. In response, we can
observe how ASIAS has handled such concerns. ASIAS is run by the

157. 14 C.F.R. § 91.25 (2018).
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MITRE corporation, and is thus not subject to FOIA requests,158 and
while ASIAs has never been subpoenaed, MITRE notes that it has a
plausible defense and that companies themselves are more likely to be
subpoenaed for the information than MITRE is.159 While not ironclad,
a similar design for a CSRS could involve providing notice to the
reporting company if the CSRS was ever subpoenaed. Even if the
ultimate organization housing the ASRS program is a government
entity such as NASA, an exemption to FOIA requests exists for
confidential commercial information,160 and another for those sharing
certain cybersecurity data.161
C.

Organizing a CSRS

There are many possible structures for the organization and
funding of a new Cyber Safety Reporting System or Cyber Resilience
Reporting System. There are two major questions: a home for the
organization, and the source of support. As illustrated by the NASAFAA partnership, they can be separate.162 Organizationally, our
choices are: stand up a new organization, host it in an existing nonprofit, or host it within a government agency. It could nominally exist
within a for profit company, but that would be self-defeating.
Similarly, creating a new organization adds to the challenges of getting
started, and there are no obvious commensurate benefits. We explore
a few of the options for housing the project below. This discussion is
designed to illustrate opportunities, rather than to state that these are
the only appropriate homes or authorities which could work.163

158. ASIAS, GENERAL AVIATION ASIAS FAQS 6 (2016), http://www.aeronomx.com/
uploads/1/0/9/6/10969420/ga_asias_faqs_pr_11-2016_rev2.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z4VQ-5K3
H].
159. Id.
160. What are FOIA Exemptions, FOIA, https://www.foia.gov/faq.html#exemptions
(Exemption 4, “Trade secrets or commercial or financial information that is confidential or
privileged.”) (last visited Mar. 24, 2018) [https://perma.cc/S28T-PVM7].
161. Weiser, supra note 134, at 2067.
162. Some agencies are encouraging the reporting of near misses. For example, the New
York Department of Financial Services says: “The Department believes that analysis of
unsuccessful threats is critically important to the ongoing development and improvement of
cybersecurity programs. . . Notice of the especially serious unsuccessful attacks may be
useful to the Department . . . and the knowledge shared through such notice can be used to
timely improve cybersecurity generally . Accordingly, Covered Entities are requested to
notify the Department of those unsuccessful attacks that appear particularly
significant. . .” However, they recognize that reporting a near miss to a regulator may raise
concerns about being penalized: “The Department trusts that Covered Entities will exercise
appropriate judgment as to which unsuccessful attacks must be reported and does not intend
to penalize Covered Entities for the exercise of honest, good faith judgment.” Frequently
Asked Questions Regarding 23 NYCRR Part 500, N.Y. DEP’T OF FIN. SERVICES,
https://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/cybersecurity_faqs.htm (last updated Mar. 23, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/4CDY-3SQ4].
163. Additionally, we only discuss existing authorities, but note that learning from near
misses does not fall cleanly into established policy battles, and it may represent a rare
opportunity for bi-partisan cooperation.
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Which regulatory agencies would want to see such a program
flourish, and secondarily, have clear authority to fund or operate such
a program? The FAA determined in the 1970s that the ASRS, designed
to learn from incidents and near misses, would enhance the safety of
the aviation system.164 In an analogous manner, the FTC can improve
cyber for consumer-facing applications, the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) for critical infrastructure, or the SEC for improving
disclosure of cybersecurity practices to investors. This structure might
also be best housed in a scientific agency such as NIST in an analogous
fashion to the ASRS program.
DHS already oversees multiple regimes aimed at improving
critical infrastructure cybersecurity information sharing, with a core
mission focused on safeguarding and securing cyberspace,165 and
remedying information shortfalls.166 DHS currently acts as the
overseeing agency to the Computer Emergency Response Team (USCERT), a program which provides protection to federal agencies
through intrusion detection and prevention, exchanges critical
cybersecurity information, and analyzes emerging cyber threats
among other activities.167 Moreover, President Obama’s Executive
Order 13636 directed DHS to create the Critical Infrastructure Cyber
Community (C3), a public-private partnership led by DHS to facilitate
critical infrastructure management using the NIST framework.168 The
Emergency Services Sector (ESS) Information-Sharing Initiative, which
coordinates an information sharing and analysis center and
stakeholders for effective information dissemination further illustrates
DHS’s mission.169 Given this well-developed mission to share, DHS
could serve as an excellent home for a CSRS system.
NIST is a respected scientific agency with expertise in
cybersecurity, issuing many standards. NIST is probably better than
other government agencies from the perspective of multinational
companies, but suffered a reputational blow in 2014 for its close
collaboration with NSA.170
164. ASRS Program Briefing, AVIATION SAFETY REPORTING SYSTEM (2016), https://
asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/ASRS_ProgramBriefing2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/K5F4-FKHK].
165. Our Mission, DHS, https://www.dhs.gov/our-mission (last visited Mar. 24, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/75AL-KJ65].
166. Information Sharing, DHS, https://www.dhs.gov/topic/information-sharing (noting
that “[r]emedying information shortfalls was a principal recommendation of the 9/11
commission”) (last visited Mar. 19, 2018) [https://perma.cc/NKX5-8ZQB].
167. About Us, US-CERT, https://www.us-cert.gov/about-us (last visited Mar. 19, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/SZM8-AS2B].
168. Using the Cybersecurity Framework, DHS (July 14, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/
using-cybersecurity-framework [https://perma.cc/48AV-HBHX].
169. Emergency Services Sector Information – Sharing Initiative, DHS (June 20, 2017)
https://www.dhs.gov/emergency-services-sector-information-sharing-initiative
[https://
perma.cc/65AJ-MRTU].
170. See, e.g., Susan Landau, On NSA’s Subversion of NIST’s Algorithm, LAWFARE (July 25,
2014, 2:00 PM), https://lawfareblog.com/nsas-subversion-nists-algorithm (“Of all the
revelations from the Snowden leaks, I find the NSA’s subversion of the National Institute of
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The funding question is complex; there are single funder models,
and multi-funder models. There are a number of agencies, including
DHS, FTC, and NIST who have a direct and broad interest in the sorts
of guidance a CSRS could offer. Funding does not need to be dramatic.
The likely initial size and funding of an experiment tilt towards a
single funder. It could well make sense to host it within a Federally
Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC) within nonprofits such as MITRE, SRI or RAND, which currently operate FFRDCs
and have a reputation for scientific and operational excellence. It also
makes sense for the organization to be structured in a way that takes
advantage of the protections offered to information sharing and
analysis organizations171
Ultimately, agencies which may bring actions against
organizations for breaches will need to either promulgate rules to
provide specific protections, or will need to put out memoranda of
understanding to give companies notice and comfort as to the
expectation of protection from sharing.
The foregoing reasons explain why incident or near-miss
reporting is a good idea. We now examine why our proposal—
voluntary reporting, along the lines of the aviation safety system—is
better than other alternatives.
D.

Single Reporting Regime

Assume that we are correct, that near-miss reporting is important.
A single repository is superior to multiple ones, for a number of
reasons.
One important reason is that the precise information collected
will be important. A recent Inspector-General report on informationsharing from the Department of Homeland Security, pursuant to the
Cybersecurity Act of 2015,172 noted this issue in a slightly different
context:173 “By design, Automated Indicator Sharing and Cyber
Standards’s (NIST) random number generator to be particularly disturbing. [. . .] This has
undermined NIST’s role in developing security and cryptography standards and is likely to
have serious long-term effects on global cybersecurity.”) [https://perma.cc/9DS8-8KD8];
Peter Woit, “The NSA, NIST, and the AMS, NOT EVEN WRONG (July 21, 2014),
http://www.math.columbia.edu/~woit/wordpress/?p=7045 (“One way this goes beyond the
now-withdrawn NIST standard is that the committee also looked at other NIST current
standards now in wide use, which in at least one other case depend upon a specific choice of
elliptic curves made by the NSA, with no explanation provided of how the choice was made.
In particular, Rivest recommends changing the ECDSA standard in FIPS186 because of this
problem.”) [https://perma.cc/F8MW-LFL4].
171. See Karp et al., supra note 133 (Information Sharing and Analysis Organizations
were created by CISA).
172. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, 129 Stat. 2242.
173. In the Cyber Information Sharing and Collection Program (CISCP), analysts are
examining submissions directly, while automated indicator sharing (AIS) is strictly
automated information. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR-GENERAL , BIENNIAL REPORT
ON DHS’ IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CYBERSECURITY ACT OF 2015 12 (2017),
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Information Sharing and Collection Program feeds have different
methods to populate information and therefore exhibit considerable
disparity in data quality… This enables the analysts to provide
recipients with more contextual information for determining the
appropriate course of action to mitigate potential threats against their
networks.”174 While it could be argued that having multiple
repositories (and hence multiple questionnaires) will result in at least
some good ones being developed, that same argument implies that
others will be not so good. We believe that it is better to expend effort
on a single high-quality site.
A central archive is also more likely to provide the broader view
needed in today’s environment.175 With multiple repositories, analysts
would need to poll them all to understand what is going on;
furthermore, collecting somewhat different data from each site will
vastly increase the analytic difficulties,176 and attackers are unlikely to
organize their activities to comport with our organizational battle
lines. If some data is unavailable, analysis will be hurt. DHS suffers
from precisely this problem because classified and unclassified data
items are stored separately.177
Finally, we note that the success of this scheme depends on
incentivized cooperation, and hence on finding the right balance
between trust and desire to receive the benefit. It’s likely that
investment in trust-building activity, including outreach and ongoing
delivery of confidentiality and anonymity will be required. If there are
multiple repositories, some are likely to be more trusted than others;
the less-trusted ones will likely receive fewer reports and less
informative reports.
E.

Analytic Regimes

By contrast, there is no a priori reason why there cannot be
multiple analyses. Indeed, multiple analytic perspectives can be
valuable, in that different researchers can take different approaches
and derive different insights. The problem, however, is that the
collected data may be believed by the organization to be somewhat
sensitive.178 Furthermore, near-miss data is often less sensitive. Had
Equifax fended off the attackers, they could have reported “danger of
https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2017-11/OIG-18-10-Nov17_0.pdf [https://
perma.cc/RJ4E-2FD5].
174. Id.
175. Id. at 4 (“contextual data [is] needed to effectively defend against ever-evolving
threats”).
176. See id. at 13.
177. Id. at 13 (“This separation restricted the analysts’ ability to compile a complete
situational awareness of a potential threat.”).
178. See supra Section II (but without experience in collecting near-miss data, it remains
to be seen how organizations will see it, once the newness wears off).

2018]

THAT WAS CLOSE!

361

a failure of a vulnerability or patch scanner,” or the “danger of a large
exposure of personal information,” as opposed to “data on 145 million
people was exposed.” The latter is far more revelatory: not many
organizations have that much data. There are questions of how the
data is gathered and processed, and also, questions of how analyses
are released. ASRS and ASIAS both take the approach that data is
gathered confidentially, and analysis is released after careful
anonymization.
One tempting approach is to gather and release anonymized
data—replace identifiers with arbitrary different ones.179 In general,
this approach is unlikely to work well. Apart from the normal risks of
anonymization,180 the data we urge be collected will contain implicit
and explicit identifying information, information that is difficult to
anonymize or redact.
Some of the issue relates to free-form text fields. These are widely
recognized to be a problem; HIPAA, for example, requires that they be
anonymized as well.181 But there is also implicit identifying
information in, e.g., a description of the reporter’s network topology.182

179. See, e.g., Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of
Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1703 (2010) (“Imagine a database packed with
sensitive information about many people . . . . Now imagine that the office that maintains
this database needs to place it in long-term storage or disclose it to a third party without
compromising the privacy of the people tracked. To eliminate the privacy risk, the office will
anonymize the data, consistent with contemporary, ubiquitous data-handling practices.
First, it will delete personal identifiers like names and social security numbers. Second, it will
modify other categories of information that act like identifiers in the particular context—the
hospital will delete the names of next of kin, the school will excise student ID numbers, and
the bank will obscure account numbers.”).
180. See Arvind Narayanan & Vitaly Shmatikov, HOW TO BREAK ANONYMITY OF THE
NETFLIX PRIZE DATASET 2 (2008), https://arxiv.org/pdf/cs/0610105v1.pdf (“How much does
the attacker need to know about a Netflix subscriber in order to identify her record in the
[anonymized] dataset . . . very little.”) [https://perma.cc/4P9D-D88M]; Paul Ohm & Scott
Peppet, What if Everything Reveals Everything?, in BIG DATA IS NOT A MONOLITH 4647 (2016)
(discussing what the authors believe to be a not-so-distant world where any piece of
information reveals all pieces of information).
181. See OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, GUIDANCE REGARDING METHODS FOR DEIDENTIFICATION OF PROTECTED HEALTH INFORMATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE HEALTH
INSURANCE PORTABILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT (HIPAA) PRIVACY RULE §3.10 (2012),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/coveredentities/D
e-identification/hhs_deid_guidance.pdf (“The de-identification standard makes no
distinction between data entered into standardized fields and information entered as free
text (i.e., structured and unstructured text)—an identifier listed in the Safe Harbor standard
must be removed regardless of its location in a record if it is recognizable as an identifier.”)
[https://perma.cc/QQ6A-HADK].
182. Different organizations use different paradigms for organizing their networks. See,
e.g., Neil Spring et al., Measuring ISP Topologies with Rocketfuel, 32 COMPUTER COMMUN.
REV. 133, 137 (2002) (“It is evident that the style of backbone design varies widely between
ISPs. Figure 7 shows three sample backbones overlaid on a map of the United States”). While
these are in general not public knowledge, it is often possible for knowledgeable individuals
to deduce or even measure them. Id.
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Again, this sort of risk is recognized by the HIPAA anonymization
guidance.183
Ideally, as much of the information as possible will be in
structured form rather than as text; this will permit automated queries,
use of machine learning techniques, etc.184
To be sure, it may be possible to anonymize a structured subset of
reports. Methods of incident data anonymization have been
developed.185 Again, though, de-anonymization is often possible if
some extra information is available.186 It is worth noting that the
minimum population size considered adequate for suitable
anonymization under HIPAA is 20,000 people;187 there are not likely to
be nearly as many records in any useful time frame.
A third possibility is to use an anonymization technique such as
differential privacy.188 This offers mathematically provable privacy
guarantees, but is only suitable for certain sorts of statistical queries; it
is not at all useful for analyzing free-text reports.
We conclude from these techniques that release of confidential
data is unlikely to balance privacy with performing interesting
analyses. The conclusion, then, is that a single agency, and one with
sufficient scientific expertise to process the data, should be responsible
for all analyses. Fairly obviously, it would be easier if this agency were
also the party that collected the data. Outside researchers could,
perhaps, be invited in to work with the in-house researchers, but this
would have to be done pursuant to suitable non-disclosure agreements
and perhaps prepublication review of any resulting papers.189

183. See OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 181, at §2.6 (“A higher risk ‘feature’ is one
that is found in many places and is publicly available. These are features that could be
exploited by anyone who receives the information.”).
184. See, e.g., Joe Calandrino, Government Datasets that Facilitate Innovation, FREEDOM TO
TINKER (Mar. 1, 2010), https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2010/03/01/government-datasetsfacilitate-innovation/. See generally FREEDOM TO TINKER, https://freedom-to-tinker.com
(subsequent articles also supporting this argument) [https://perma.cc/3QA9-CA7P].
185. See generally, e.g., Janak J. Parekh, Privacy-Preserving Distributed Event Corroboration
(2007) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation) (on file with Columbia University), http://
www.cs.columbia.edu/~janak/research/thesis-20070501.pdf [https://perma.cc/EJ2S-WKFL].
186. See Ohm & Peppet, supra note 180.
187. See OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 181, at §1.4.
188. See Cynthia Dwork, Differential Privacy: A Survey of Results, in THEORY AND
APPLICATIONS OF MODELS OF COMPUTATION 1 (Manindra Agrawal et al. 2008) (commonly
cited survey on the subject).
189. Presumably, the classified networks would have their own incident reporting
system and repository; as with the DHS effort, the classified and unclassified data would
have to be stored separately. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR-GENERAL, supra note 173. It might be
useful to have a single analytic system that could process both classes of data. OFFICE OF
INSPECTOR-GENERAL, supra note 173 (“By acquiring a cross-domain solution, DHS can
provide more detailed cyber information, improve the quality and usefulness of cyber threat
reports, and correlate cyber threat indicators and defensive measures across its unclassified
and classified environments.”).
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Light-Touch Cooperation

While a mandatory regulatory scheme might be preferable,190
such an approach seems unlikely today. Even apart from the current
political tensions, there is a profound partisan divide on the
desirability and utility of regulations. We are thus suggesting a “lighttouch” voluntary scheme. While we do not know for certain that there
will be cooperation, we are cautiously optimistic. The same sort of
approach has succeeded in aviation and many other fields;191 we
believe that it will help here.
The proof, of course, will be in whether the resulting information
actually helps. Based on DHS’s results with threat information, we
suspect that it will.192 We also interviewed representatives of selected
DHS components and Federal entities—consumers of this
information—and found that they generally used this information to
improve their network security controls. However, they also used the
cyber threat indicators to detect malicious actors, and mitigate
anomalies and possible threats to their networks.
The key, of course, will be the published analyses: is enough
information disseminated, to the right people, and quickly enough?
CONCLUSION
It is clear that there is a serious cybersecurity problem. While the
ultimate solutions will likely have to be technical—neither criminal
hackers nor hostile nations will vanish any time soon—today’s efforts
are hampered by a lack of information. We can augment today’s
“indicator-centric” information sharing schemes with new types of
analysis. A voluntary and incentivized scheme focused on the
collection, analysis, and publication of lessons is an important part of
how other fields improve their safety and security. The complexity of
gathering information about real cyber incidents leads us to suggest
an effort focused on near misses. Experience in other fields has shown
that trying to bring voluntary reports to regulatory agencies often fails.
Public policy must balance between ensuring the public is
protected, while providing sufficient incentives for information
gathering, analysis, and publication. On the one hand, companies
must be provided with sufficient certainty that their disclosures will
not come back to haunt them, but should not be able to avoid liability
by virtue of their disclosures.
Against the backdrop of liability for data breaches, the question
becomes obvious: how long can we keep saying “that was close!”?
Without an effective cybersecurity plan, companies risk increasingly
190. See Bellovin, supra note 8.
191. See supra Section III.A.
192. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR-GENERAL, supra note 173.

364

COLO. TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 16.2

serious backlash from government and consumers. However, these
same companies lack the visibility into ongoing threats which other
similarly situated companies may have successfully prevented. As a
result, companies make the same mistakes repeatedly and
inadvertently subject themselves to massive liability. The
development of a near-miss reporting system seeks to alleviate
company stress from attackers and threats of liability by incentivizing
companies to share what they experience.193
A.

Industry Should Experiment With Near-Miss Reporting

Industry should take steps to experiment with near-miss
reporting. That includes creating working definitions of accident and
near miss, crafting forms and databases to hold the input, and
experimentally processing them to inform discussion of effort. If a new
organization were to stand up to collect data, how much would it get?
We could run an experiment to find out.
There has been some work on definitions,194 but more work with
the goal of specifying near misses would help set minds at ease. If
industry creates a working definition, that definition could later be
adopted into law or incorporated by the information reporting agency
to allow for greater clarity in what creates liability for the reporting
entity.
B.

Regulators Should Reward Reporting of Near Misses

Regulators should create incentives and remove roadblocks to
learning from our mistakes195. The challenges of securing systems
today are obvious, and they will get worse. Initially, this should be
incentives for experimentation as needed, with a clear path to building
systematic capabilities for securing our society.

193. Organizations may experience events and not have the resources to investigate or
analyze it. Expertise is in short supply and strange events are common. Additionally, a single
event may happen absent context that a broader scientific agency might be able to see.
194. See, e.g., C. Matthew Curtin & Lee T. Ayres, Using Science to Combat Data Loss:
Analyzing Breaches by Type and Industry, 4 J. L. & POL’Y FOR THE INFO. SOC’Y 569 (2008).
195. The precise nature of such rewards varies across disciplines. In cybersecurity, it
may vary from reduced penalties to significant rewards for well executed reporting of
interesting misses. Most important is an incentive which is sufficient to generate a norm of
reporting without creating moral hazards.

